General Property Theory

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gennady Innokentievich Cherkasov
Author(s):  
Wayne A. Davis

The property theory of de se belief denies that believing is a propositional attitude, maintaining instead that for Lingens to believe that he himself is lost is for him to self-attribute the property of being lost. For Lingens to believe that Lingens is lost is for him to self-attribute the independent property of being such that Lingens is lost. The chapter argues that this theory postulates differences where we expect uniformity, introduces unnecessary theoretical complexity, is false to a variety of linguistic and phenomenological facts, and fails to explain many psychological and linguistic facts. If “self-attribute a property” means “believing oneself to have the property,” then the theory provides no explanation of de se belief. The author sketches a propositional theory on which the objects of the attitudes are complexes of concepts (thoughts), de se attitudes involving one type of indexical concept.


Author(s):  
David J. Lobina

The introduction of recursion into linguistics was the result of applying some of the results of mathematical logic to the study of language. In particular, recursion was introduced in the 1950s as a general property of the mechanical procedure underlying the grammar, in order to account for language’s discrete infinity and expressive power—in the 1950s, this mechanical procedure was a production system, whereas more recently, of course, it is the set-operator merge. Unfortunately, the recent literature has confused the general recursive property of a grammar with specific instances of (recursive) rules/operations within a grammar; more worryingly still, there has been a general conflation of these recursive rules with some of the self-embedded structures these rules can generate, adding to the confusion. The conflation is manifold but always fallacious. Moreover, language manifests a much more generally recursive structure than is usually recognized: bundles of the universal (Specifier)-Head-Complement(s) geometry.


Author(s):  
J. E Penner

Ranging over a host of issues, Property Rights: A Re-Examination pinpoints and addresses a number of theoretical problems at the heart of property theory. Part 1 reconsiders and refutes the bundle of rights picture of property and the related nominalist theories of property, showing that ownership reflects a tripartite structure of title, the right to immediate, exclusive, possession, and the power to licence what would otherwise be a trespass, and to transfer ownership. Part 2 explores in detail the Hohfeldian theory of jural relations, in particular liberties and powers and Hohfeld’s concept of ‘multital’ jural relations, and shows that this theory fails to illuminate the nature of property rights, and indeed obscures much that it is vital to understand about them. Part 3 considers the form and justification of property rights, beginning with the relation an owner’s liberty to use her property and her ‘right to exclude’, with particular reference to the tort of nuisance. Next up for consideration is the Kantian theory of property rights, the deficiencies of which lead us to understand that the only natural right to things is a form of use- or usufructory-right. Part 3 concludes by addressing the ever-vexed question of property rights in land.


1953 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
MABEL NEWCOMER

RSC Advances ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (33) ◽  
pp. 20557-20569
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Heydari ◽  
Farhad Sharif ◽  
Morteza Ebrahimi

The use of catechol-containing comonomers as a general property enhancer to achieve unique properties has received particular attention for designing bioinspired polymeric materials.


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