Refinements and Incentive Efficiency in Walrasian Models of Insurance Economies

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Citanna ◽  
Paolo Siconolfi
Keyword(s):  
Insurance Economies ◽  
Incentive Efficiency

Bankenrettung, „constructive ambiguity“ und moralisches Risiko

2011 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Vollmer ◽  
Michael Diemer
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Risk Behaviour ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Incentive Efficiency

SummaryBased on the model of Cordella and Yeyati (2003) this paper compares the effect of several bailout strategies of a „lender of last resort“ (LoLR) on a bank’s risk behaviour. We show that both „constructed ambiguity“, defined as a properly mixed strategy, and a pure strategy where a LoLR rescues always or never are not the optimal strategies. The LoLR should rather apply a contingent rule which means that he should announce and commit ex ante to a bailout policy depending on a verifiable state of nature. For this reason the optimal bailout policy should not be case by case, but follow an ex ante defined rule. Consequently, there is no contradiction between incentive efficiency and transparency of an efficient LoLR-policy.

Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions

Econometrica ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Double Auctions ◽  
Incentive Efficiency
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