A General Model for Dynamic Price Competition between Airlines

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lennart Stern
2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Dubé ◽  
Günter J. Hitsch ◽  
Peter E. Rossi

The conventional wisdom in economic theory holds that switching costs make markets less competitive. This article challenges this claim. The authors formulate an empirically realistic model of dynamic price competition that allows for differentiated products and imperfect lock-in. They calibrate this model with data from frequently purchased packaged goods markets. These data are ideal in the sense that they have the necessary variation to identify switching costs separately from consumer heterogeneity. Equally important, consumers exhibit inertia in their brand choices, a form of psychological switching cost. This makes the results applicable to the broad range of products that are distinctly identified (i.e., branded) rather than just to products for which there is a product adoption cost or explicit switching fee. In the simulations, prices are as much as 18% lower with than without switching costs. More important, equilibrium prices do not increase even in the presence of switching costs that are of the same order of magnitude as product price.


2006 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. 232-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Bergemann ◽  
Juuso Välimäki

2011 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 1078-1093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz ◽  
Kalyan Talluri

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (02) ◽  
pp. 1640006
Author(s):  
Nikolay Zenkevich ◽  
Margarita Gladkova

In this paper, the market of software products is considered. Regularly this market is suffering from existence of counterfeit or pirate products which causes problems and challenges for original software developers. Taking this fact into account the paper is trying to solve the problem of price competition on this market. The software company set the price and the quality of the software product while the counterfeit or pirate company suggests the consumers the product of the lower quality. First the general model is analyzed and price equilibrium is defined. Second, the monopoly case is considered separately and optimal software price is defined. Finally, it is supposed that there are two companies that produce original software on the market who compete and differentiate in product quality, and there are two pirate companies who produce the same type of software. The duopoly case is analyzed and equilibrium prices for competing companies are obtained in the explicit form.


Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianbo Zhu ◽  
Qianqian Shi ◽  
Peng Wu ◽  
Zhaohan Sheng ◽  
Xiangyu Wang

This paper considers a repeated duopoly game of prefabrication contractors in mega infrastructure projects and assumes the contractors exhibit bounded rationality. Based on the theory of bifurcation of dynamical systems, a dynamic price competition model is constructed considering different competition strategies. Accordingly, the stability of the equilibrium point of the system is discussed considering different initial market capacities, and numerical simulation is performed. The results show the system has a unique equilibrium solution when initial capacity is high and the parameters meet certain conditions. The contractors’ price adjustment strategy has an important influence on system stability. However, an overly aggressive competition strategy is not conducive to system stability. Moreover, the system is sensitive to initial parameter values.


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