The Dynamics of Norms and Convention under Random Matching

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Ille
Keyword(s):  
Random Matching

scholarly journals Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random-Matching Model

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andres Erosa ◽  
Ricardo de Oliveira Cavalcanti ◽  
Ted Temzelides
Keyword(s):  
Random Matching ◽  
Matching Model ◽  
Reserve Management ◽  
Private Money ◽  
Random Matching Model

scholarly journals Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games

2016 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyee Deb ◽  
Julio González-Díaz ◽  
Jérôme Renault
Keyword(s):  
Random Matching ◽  
Matching Games ◽  
Folk Theorems

Random Matching Pursuit for Image Watermarking

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guang Hua ◽  
Lifan Zhao ◽  
Haijian Zhang ◽  
Guoan Bi ◽  
Yong Xiang
Keyword(s):  
Matching Pursuit ◽  
Image Watermarking ◽  
Random Matching

scholarly journals Money, random matching and endogenous growth: A quantitative analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 173-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Kamhon Kan ◽  
Ching-Chong Lai ◽  
Chih-Hsing Liao
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Endogenous Growth ◽  
Random Matching

Endogenous Matching and Money with Random Consumption Preferences

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Hogan ◽  
William J. Luther
Keyword(s):  
Random Matching ◽  
Matching Model ◽  
Endogenous Matching ◽  
Economic Interactions ◽  
Matching Models

Abstract Current money matching models employ either random matching or endogenous matching processes, both of which oversimplify the problem. We maintain that, although most economic interactions are intentional, some randomness remains. We offer an endogenous matching model of money with random consumption preferences. Our model preserves the intentionality of economic interactions while leaving scope for chance. We identify the conditions for potential monetary and nonmonetary equilibria and compare them to those of other endogenous matching and random matching models.

scholarly journals Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary King ◽  
Richard Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Propensity Score ◽  
Causal Inference ◽  
Propensity Score Matching ◽  
Propensity Scores ◽  
Original Data ◽  
The Other ◽  
Randomized Experiment ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
Popular Method ◽  
Matching Methods

We show that propensity score matching (PSM), an enormously popular method of preprocessing data for causal inference, often accomplishes the opposite of its intended goal—thus increasing imbalance, inefficiency, model dependence, and bias. The weakness of PSM comes from its attempts to approximate a completely randomized experiment, rather than, as with other matching methods, a more efficient fully blocked randomized experiment. PSM is thus uniquely blind to the often large portion of imbalance that can be eliminated by approximating full blocking with other matching methods. Moreover, in data balanced enough to approximate complete randomization, either to begin with or after pruning some observations, PSM approximates random matching which, we show, increases imbalance even relative to the original data. Although these results suggest researchers replace PSM with one of the other available matching methods, propensity scores have other productive uses.

A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (12) ◽  
pp. 3817-3835
Author(s):  
Takuo Sugaya ◽  
Alexander Wolitzky
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Smoothness Condition ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
Number Of Firms

We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases. (JEL C72, C73, D83)

Price distribution in a random matching model

2004 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Kultti ◽  
Juha Virrankoski
Keyword(s):  
Random Matching ◽  
Matching Model ◽  
Price Distribution ◽  
Random Matching Model
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