Individual Investor Portfolio Performance in Retirement Savings Accounts

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Su (Sally) Gan ◽  
Richard A. Heaney ◽  
Paul Gerrans
2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 652-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Su (Sally) Gan ◽  
Richard Heaney ◽  
Paul Gerrans

2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1141-1219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raj Chetty ◽  
John N. Friedman ◽  
Søren Leth-Petersen ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen ◽  
Tore Olsen

Abstract Using 41 million observations on savings for the population of Denmark, we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice. Subsidies for retirement accounts, which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings, primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts. We estimate that each $1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent. In contrast, policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action—such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts—increase wealth accumulation substantially. We estimate that approximately 15% of individuals are “active savers” who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts; 85% of individuals are “passive savers” who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf. Active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated. We conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons: (i) subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond, (ii) they generate substantial crowd-out conditional on response, and (iii) they do not increase the savings of passive individuals, who are least prepared for retirement.


Author(s):  
Pei Cheng Yu

Abstract This paper incorporates quasi–hyperbolic discounting into a Mirrlees taxation model to study the design of retirement policies for present-biased agents. I show that the government can improve the screening of productivity by exploiting time inconsistency. This is done by providing commitment to sophisticated agents and taking advantage of the incorrect beliefs of naïve agents. This can be achieved even if the degrees of present bias and sophistication are private information. I also demonstrate how the government can implement the optimal mechanism using retirement savings accounts and social security benefits.


Subject Upgrading the US nuclear arsenal. Significance The United States is undertaking the most comprehensive modernisation of its nuclear forces since the 1970s and 1980s. Over the next ten years, annual US spending on nuclear weapons is projected to increase from about 15 billion dollars to 25 billion dollars per year to upgrade the three legs of the US nuclear arsenal: land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles and strategic bombers. This recapitalisation is considered necessary to sustain deterrence against growing strategic threats from Russia and China and regional nuclear threats from North Korea, but will entail trade-offs among other military assets far more likely to be used in any conflict. Impacts Russian rhetoric towards Ukraine and eastern Europe will strengthen the hands of pro-nuclear lobbies in Washington. Greater nuclear spending will increase the drive to find savings in military personnel costs. By shifting pensions to retirement savings accounts, it will increase the attractiveness of the military as a mid-career employment option.


Author(s):  
Stephen Roll ◽  
Sam Bufe ◽  
Olga Kondratjeva ◽  
Michal Grinstein-Weiss

Abstract In 2015, the U.S. Treasury Department launched myRA, a no-fee retirement account designed for people who lacked employer-sponsored retirement options. We report findings from two behavioral field experiments intended to motivate interest in using the tax refund to open and fund myRAs directly through the tax-filing process. These experiments, administered to more than 100,000 low-income tax filers in 2016, embedded persuasive messages in emails sent to filers and directly within online tax-filing software. We find that interest in myRA was generally very low, although interest and enrollment intentions varied depending on the framing of the program's benefits.


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