Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidhan K. Goyal ◽  
Chul W. Park
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

scholarly journals Board leadership structure and earnings quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinedu Francis Egbunike ◽  
Augustine N. Odum
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

Purpose One main concern and issue affecting earnings quality is the extent to which managers manipulate earnings to mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. This study builds on prior research and examines empirically the relationship between board leadership structure and earnings quality of manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The purpose of this paper is to specifically focus on four board structure characteristics: board size, composition, proportion of non-executive directors and CEO duality. Design/methodology/approach Data used for this investigation were collected from secondary sources, i.e. annual reports and accounts. The study used the Pooled OLS regression model to examine the effect of the board structure on earnings management for a sample of 45 non-financial listed Nigerian companies (conglomerates, consumer goods and industrial goods firms) for the years 2011 to 2016. Findings Based on the analysis, board size and board composition were positive and significant. However, proportion of non-executive directors was negative and significant; while, CEO duality was positive and statistically significant. It was consequently recommended that audit firms should review their audit business model and become more circumspect of their client, e.g. provide fraud assessment and checks for earnings quality. Boards should not just reflect size but rather the skills and expertise of individuals appointed to the board. Furtherance to this, the effectiveness of boards can be improved by committees and sub-committees allocation of duties. Originality/value Few studies have addressed this area in the country.

The Role of Board Leadership Structure in Firm Governance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Independent Director ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Board Chair ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Board Leadership Structure

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.

scholarly journals Board leadership: Antecedents and performance outcomes

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Yi Wang ◽  
Bob Clift
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Strong Relationship ◽  
Performance Outcomes ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Subsequent Performance ◽  
Board Leadership ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Board Leadership Structure ◽  
Managerial Shareholdings

In this paper several theories, which make different predictions about the effect of board leadership structure on firm performance, are tested. The results indicate that, for Australian listed companies, there is no strong relationship between leadership structure and subsequent performance. It is reported that companies with higher blockholder ownership or lower managerial shareholdings tend to have an affiliated chairman; firm with higher managerial shareholdings tend to have an executive chairman. The evidence suggests that there is no one optimal leadership structure; each structure, which could be an outcome of a rational choice process influenced by other governance characteristics of individual firms, may have associated costs and benefits.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document