scholarly journals The Average Tree Permission Value for Games with a Permission Tree

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van den Brink ◽  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Gerard van der Laan ◽  
Dolf J. J. Talman
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van den Brink ◽  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Gerard van der Laan ◽  
A. J. J. Talman
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Huettner ◽  
Harald Wiese

A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) captures a situation in which players can achieve certain payoffs by cooperating. We assume that the players are part of a hierarchy. In the literature, this invokes the assumption that subordinates cannot cooperate without the permission of their superiors. Instead, we assume that superiors can force their subordinates to cooperate. We show how both notions correspond to each other by means of dual TU games. This way, we capture the idea that a superiors’ ability to enforce cooperation can be seen as the ability to neutralize her subordinate’s threat to abstain from cooperation. Moreover, we introduce the coercion value for games with a hierarchy and provide characterizations thereof that reveal the similarity to the permission value.


2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 1059-1063
Author(s):  
Wan Fa Fu ◽  
De Li Luo ◽  
Tao Tang

Tritium safety research on the tritium system of Test Blanket Module(TBM) was carried out. At first, according to safety analysis task and method of tritium system, the research process framework about the tritium safety analysis was given. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) on tritium system was carried out, analyzing the calculation process of permission value of TBM Tritium release. In order to compare and assess safety grade of the tritium system among all kinds of nuclear facilities, calculation formula was given, finally.


1996 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van den Brink ◽  
Robert P. Gilles
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 155-188
Author(s):  
Subhadip Chakrabarti ◽  
Amandine Ghintran ◽  
Rajnish Kumar

Abstract We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the payoff is given by the permission value. We focus on optimal hierarchies, namely those, for which the payoff of the top agent is maximized. For additive games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more productive agents occupy higher positions. The result can be extended to non-additive games with appropriate restrictions on the value function. Next, we consider auctions where agents bid for positions in a vertical hierarchy of depth 2 . Under standard auctions, usually this results in a non-cogent hierarchy.


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