Shareholder Rights, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Value

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Zhang
2014 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 1167-1196 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIJN CREMERS ◽  
ALLEN FERRELL

2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. Caton ◽  
Jeremy Goh

AbstractWe examine the effect of poison pill adoptions on firm value, controlling for the adopting firm's preexisting corporate governance structure. We find that only companies with the most democratic governance structures, defined as those with the fewest preexisting protective governance provisions, experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns and significantly positive abnormal revisions in five-year earnings growth rate forecasts. Moreover, regression results indicate that abnormal returns and forecast revisions are significantly related to governance structure and not to board composition or subsequent merger activity.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parveen Gupta ◽  
Duane Kennedy ◽  
Samuel Weaver

The Globe and Mail’s Report on Business annually publishes governance rankings for more than 200 companies represented in the TSX/S&P index. There are four sub-categories that comprise the composite scores: board composition; board and CEO compensation; shareholder rights; and board governance disclosure. The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between the composite or sub-category corporate governance scores and various measures of firm value. We test for this association using data for 2002 through 2005 on the Report on Business rankings and various financial and market measures. Overall, our study does not find an association between the composite or subcategory corporate governance scores and the various measures of firm value.


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