scholarly journals CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking and the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Banking Industry

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Luo ◽  
Frank M. Song
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Compensation Risk

Does bank governance affect risk and efficiency? Evidence from Islamic banks in GCC countries

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Srairi ◽  
Khawla Bourkhis ◽  
Asma Houcine
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Bank Efficiency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Gcc Countries

Purpose The motivation of the study is to shed further light on the question of whether the governance structure of Islamic banks (IBs) has an impact on the efficiency and risk of Islamic banks operating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after the global financial crisis and during the period 2010–2018. This study aims to examine the extent of governance structure on the efficiency and risk of IBs as the effect of the financial crisis has been less on IBs. In addition, the authors are interested in the GCC region as it represents the hub of Islamic finance. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the authors examine how the banking governance structure affects the risk-taking and performance of IBs in the GCC countries between 2010 and 2018. The authors construct a banking governance index (CGI) composed of sub-indices for the board structure, risk management, transparency and disclosure, audit committee, Sharia supervisory board and investment account holders. Unlike the majority of previous studies, bank performance is measured with technical efficiency scores using a data envelopment analysis and the authors use a comprehensive CGI. Findings The results show that IBs in GCC countries adhere to 54% of the attributes covered in the CGI. The authors also note a lack of disclosure regarding the investment account holders and the audit committee. As well, the results indicate that bank governance is positively associated with risk-taking and bank efficiency. Banking risk is influenced by the Sharia board and risk management while bank efficiency is affected by the characteristics of the board structure and investment account holders. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has developed a comprehensive governance index for IBs in GCC countries that includes a wide range of governance dimensions. The study contributes to the literature on governance in the banking sector by simultaneously examining its impact on the risk-taking and efficiency of IBs and recognizes the dynamic relation between these three variables for IB.

Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina E. Bannier ◽  
Eberhard Feess ◽  
Natalie Packham
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking Industry

scholarly journals Risk-taking behavior, earnings quality, and bank performance: A profit frontier approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-304
Author(s):  
M. Pilar García-Alcober ◽  
Diego Prior ◽  
Emili Tortosa-Ausina ◽  
Manuel Illueca
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Bank Risk ◽  
Bank Performance ◽  
Bank Efficiency ◽  
Savings Banks ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior

After the financial crisis of 2007–2008, some bank performance dimensions have been the subject of debate, two of which are bank efficiency and bank risk-taking behavior. The literature on bank efficiency and productivity has grown considerably over the past three decades, and has gained momentum in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Interest in bank risk-taking behavior, usually focusing on its links to monetary policy, has been relatively low, but has also increased exponentially in more recent years. This article combines these two streams of research. Specifically, we test whether more inefficient banks take greater risks when selecting borrowers, charging interests, and requiring collateral, and whether these links between inefficiency and risk change according to the type of bank. Our analysis centers on the Spanish banking system, which has been severely affected by the burst of the housing bubble and has undergone substantial restructuring. To test our hypotheses, we created a database with information on banks and savings banks, their borrowers (non-financial firms), and the links between them. The study also contributes to the literature by considering a novel profit frontier approach. Our results suggest that more inefficient banks take greater risks in selecting their borrowers, and that this high-taking behavior is not offset by higher interest rates. JEL CLASSIFICATION C14; C61; G21; L50

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