Non-Separable Pollution Control: Implications for a CO2 Emissions Cap and Trade System

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark D. Agee ◽  
Scott Atkinson ◽  
Thomas D. Crocker ◽  
Jonathan W. Williams
2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark D. Agee ◽  
Scott E. Atkinson ◽  
Thomas D. Crocker ◽  
Jonathan W. Williams

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 572-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Schmalensee ◽  
Robert N Stavins

Abstract This article reviews the design of environmental markets for pollution control over the past 30 years, and identifies key market-design lessons for future applications. The focus is on a subset of the cap-and-trade systems that have been implemented, planned, or proposed around the world. Three criteria led us to the selection of systems for review. First, among the broader class of tradable permit systems, our focus is exclusively on cap-and-trade mechanisms, thereby excluding emission-reduction-credit or offset programmes. Second, among cap-and-trade mechanisms, we examine only those that target pollution abatement, and so we do not include applications to natural resource management, such as individual transferable quota systems used to regulate fisheries. Third, we focus on the most prominent applications—those that are particularly important environmentally, economically, or both.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-201
Author(s):  
Raphael Calel

One important motivation for creating cap-and-trade programs for carbon emissions is the expectation that they will stimulate much-needed low-carbon innovation. I construct a new panel of British firms to investigate this hypothesis, finding that the European carbon market has encouraged greater low-carbon patenting and R&D spending among regulated firms without necessarily driving short-term reductions in carbon intensity of output. This stands in contrast to past cap-and-trade programs, which have primarily spurred adoption of existing pollution control technologies, with little effect on innovation. I discuss how to reconcile these contrasting findings and implications for the future of carbon markets. (JEL D22, O32, O34, Q52, Q54, Q58)


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