Safeguarding the Purchasing Power of Money under Conditions of the International Gold Standard and the European Monetary Union Seen from an Institutional Economic Perspective

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rudolf Richter
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
Purchasing Power ◽  
Economic Perspective ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Institutional Economic

In Defense of the Euro: Austrian School Approach (Critics of ECB Errors and Brussel’s Interventionism)

2012 ◽  
pp. 78-100
Author(s):  
J. Huerta De Soto
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
Social Problems ◽  
National Currency ◽  
Austrian School ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Political Interests ◽  
Monetary Authorities

The mechanism of euro functioning is analyzed in the article from the standpoint of limiting the autonomy of monetary authorities of the European monetary union members, which precludes them from manipulating national currency for the short sighted political interests and postponing painful structural reforms under crises aimed at liberalizing the economy. In some aspects euro excels the classical gold standard, which fell under monetary nationalism attack in the 1930s. Motives and arguments of critics and adversaries are analyzed and the reasons for euro defense are exposed. Real economic and social problems of Europe and ECB errors are described.

European Monetary Union: Lessons from the Classical Gold Standard.

1993 ◽  
Vol 103 (419) ◽  
pp. 1076 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Goodhart ◽  
M. Panic
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
European Monetary

The Euro, The Gold Standard, and German Power

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beverly Crawford Ames ◽  
Armon Rezai
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Monetary Cooperation ◽  
Theory Of Hegemonic Stability ◽  
Hegemonic Stability ◽  
Do So

Kindleberger’s theory of hegemonic stability states that fixed exchange rate regimes require a leader that will provide it with disproportionate resources to ensure stability. Applying his theory to European monetary cooperation, we argue that, like the tools of Goethe’s “Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” European Monetary Union was constructed as a “self-regulating system,” and it threatens to run amok without a hegemonic leader. Germany has exercised “soft hegemony” in Europe, providing the European Union with disproportionate resources to stabilize the single market. It has the capability to be the Eurozone’s leader. But, by 2017, blinded by its ordoliberal ideology, i t refused to do so, instead placing the burden of cooperation on the weak. If Germany continues to refuse to play the role of the hegemonic leader, European Monetary Union faces collapse.

The Effect of Membership in the European Monetary Union on Trade Between Member Countries (An Empirical Study)

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ihor Soroka
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Euro Adoption ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Short Run

The question of whether or not to adopt the euro is a very important one, not only for the 13 European Union members that do not share the same currency, but also for future EU candidates. Current literature on the effect of the euro on trade is scarce since the European Monetary Union (EMU) was officially created in 1999, and up until recently there has not been enough data to analyze this issue. This paper aims to estimate the effect of the euro on trade between member countries using the standard gravity model of trade. Using data from current 25 EU members over the period from 1997 to 2004, I show that higher trade volumes between EMU members cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. I find evidence that the euro adoption has had a short-run effect on bilateral trade and that this effect is eliminated over a short period of time. My findings suggest that members of the EMU trade on average from 8.8% to 47% more compared to non-members depending on the type of regression used, while members of the Free Trade Agreement trade 61.3% more. The effect of the euro on trade is eliminated as soon as I control for country-pair specific effects that include the FTA effect as well as history of trade relations between two countries. I conclude that the adoption of the euro should be seen as a final step in the European economic and monetary integration for countries that already benefit from relatively high volumes of bilateral trade. Full text availale at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i1.166

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