Healthcare Project Finance Investments in Italy with Public-Private Interactive Risk Sharing

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Moro Visconti
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 122-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Moro Visconti

Healthcare infrastructural investments are a key strategic issue in countries such as Italy, whose aging population faces severe public budget constraints, exacerbated by the unprecedented recession. The choice between traditional procurement (TP) and Public Private Partnerships/Project Finance (PPP/PF) is by now a cornerstone of public strategies concerning complex infrastructural investments. PESTLE and SWOT strategic analysis provides a systematic and comprehensive reflection of the external and internal operational environment but has infrequently been applied to infrastructural procurement. Risk sharing between public and private actors and consequent corporate governance and ownership issues are still under-investigated in the literature, especially if associated with innovative PESTLE and SWOT instruments. Evidence shows that PESTLE and SWOT analysis improves procurement choices and public-private partnering, softening governance concerns. Since empirical considerations about Italy may be globally extended, even beyond the healthcare industry, the audience of this study may conveniently widen well beyond its apparently narrow focus.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-84
Author(s):  
Min HAN
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
pp. 35-38
Author(s):  
Anna Korombel
Keyword(s):  

W artykule przedstawiono ryzyko towarzyszące inwestycjom realizowanym na zasadach project finance w polskiej energetyce cieplnej. Posłużono się przykładem projektu unowocześnienia systemu zaopatrzenia w energię cieplną obiektów Spółdzielni Mieszkaniowej realizowanego metodą project finance. Przedstawiono rodzaje ryzyka (techniczne, rynkowe, finansowe, infrastruktury, ochrony środowiska, prawne, polityczne, siły wyższej) wraz z zastosowanymi przez strony inwestycji sposobami ich ograniczania. Zwrócono również uwagę na przyjętą w projekcie alokację ryzyka między uczestnikami inwestycji.


Author(s):  
Truman Packard ◽  
Ugo Gentilini ◽  
Margaret Grosh ◽  
Philip O’Keefe ◽  
Robert Palacios ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 2485-2492
Author(s):  
M.H.Kh. Al-Shaeli ◽  

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