Fiscal Rules, Decentralization and Public Finances: Making Sense of Balanced Budget Requirements for Sub-National Governments

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Seifert
2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 635-672
Author(s):  
Sharon N. Kioko ◽  
Michelle L. Lofton

We test the effect of balanced budget requirements (BBRs) on budget outcomes using data published in audited financial statements. With a focus on the General Fund, we find states frequently reported deficits in their adopted budgets and relied on sizeable and favorable expenditure variances to close budget gaps before the end of the budget period. Empirical analysis shows that technical or strict BBRs procedures did not increase the likelihood that a state would report a balanced budget. We corroborate our findings using fund balance data. If technical or strict BBRs are effective, states would report higher fund balances, all else equal. Results show that states that adopted political BBRs reported lower fund balances. More importantly, the adoption of strict or technical BBRs did not lead to higher fund balances.


2017 ◽  
Vol 241 ◽  
pp. R13-R32
Author(s):  
Michael McMahon

A defining feature of (at least) the last three general elections has been the emphasis placed on each political party's fiscal credibility and their ability to deliver “sound public finances”. Applying the logic of household book-keeping, balancing the fiscal budget is said to capture such soundness. There is, however, little evidence that a balanced budget is necessarily sound. Instead, the evolution of public finances depends on (1) both the fiscal choices made on the level of spending and taxation, (2) the underlying growth of the economy which depends on far more than the fiscal decisions, and (3) interest rates on government debt and the financing needs of the government. As the economic situation changes, so too does the likely path of debt to GDP and hence the possible fiscal options open to a country. Sticking to the soundbite of “sound finances” has often distracted from the underlying menu of political choices and as such is a disruptive narrative in UK economics today.


Equilibrium ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-642
Author(s):  
Agata Szymańska

Research background: The latest economic and financial crisis has seriously injured European Union Member States, affecting the condition of their public finances. In the face of the crisis, the EU made a special effort to increase the effectiveness of national fiscal frameworks, e.g. by improving the compliance with legislation. The post 2009 reforms were aimed at providing a solid economic foundation for the national fiscal frameworks, especially in the high-debt euro area countries. Purpose of the article: The goal of this research is twofold. Firstly, it aims to provide an outline of the national fiscal governance in the EU. Secondly, the paper analyzes the changes in the core measures of fiscal governance in the EU between the crisis period and the year 2016 (due to the latest available data) and investigates the similarities in the progress made by the 28 EU countries in restoring balance in public finance. Methods: To achieve the goal, the literature review and the analysis of core elements of national fiscal frameworks are provided. In the empirical section the grouping method for all 28 EU countries based on the Ward's agglomerative hierarchical clustering method is employed. The study uses data derived from the AMECO database (in the case of fiscal data) and the European Commission thematic data for quality indexes of particular elements of fiscal governance (numerical fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks and independent fiscal institutions). Findings & Value added: This paper contributes to the literature by, on the one hand, attempting to analyze changes in main fiscal governance measures and, on the other hand, by assessing their link with public finance through employment of the agglomerative clustering method. Based on the results, the conclusion about the importance of the improvement in fiscal frameworks is provided. The analysis shows that countries with better national fiscal framework achieved better results in public finances regardless the macroeconomic conditions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 71-90
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Davies

The story of austerity is entwined with experiments in city-regionalism, authoritarianism, fiscal and political centralisation and downloading or scalar dumping. Interpenetrating institutional, territorial and scalar restructurings have significant implications for politics and governing cultures, and relations between local states and citizens. This chapter focuses on the evolving powers and liabilities accruing to sub-national governments in the period since the Global Financial Crisis, read through revenue streams, fiscal rules and changes to spatial and jurisdictional capacities. The key finding across the eight cities is that municipalities face a variable and increasing mix of upward and downward constraints undermining their political capacity. Considered from the standpoint of governability, state rescaling in the period since the Crisis has tended to consolidate disciplinary neoliberalism, creating additional pressures on local governments to reinforce their tax bases through place-marketing. These processes also make cities more governable for national and provincial elites, pushing local state mechanisms into closer alignment with the administrative and financial priorities of upper tier apparatuses.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 607-636
Author(s):  
Mark Humphery-Jenner

Governments periodically receive accusations of over-spending. These accusations are sometimes warranted. Some commentators propose that strict tax and expenditure limits (TELs) and/or balanced budget requirements (BBRs) may resolve excessive expenditure. Governments can implement TELs and BBRs through constitutional amendments, statutory schemes, or non-binding aspirational goals. They have been proposed as a remedy to allegations of over-spending in some European countries. However, it is not entirely clear if TELs or BBRs are effective or will resolve excess expenditure. I analyze TELs and BBRs as implemented in the United States and Australia. I argue that the Australian model of aspirational TELs and BBRs is beneficial if there is a political will to enforce them. However, if there is no such political will, then statutory (as opposed to constitutional) TELs and BBRs best strike a balance of flexibility and constraint.


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