scholarly journals Institutional Investors, Political Connections and Incidence of Corporate Fraud

Author(s):  
Wenfeng Wu ◽  
Sofia A. Johan ◽  
Oliver M. Rui
2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-327
Author(s):  
Chwee Ming Tee ◽  
Puspavathy Rasiah

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine whether institutional investors monitoring attenuate (exacerbate) weaker earnings persistence in politically connected firms (PCFs). In addition, it investigates whether earnings persistence do vary according to different types of political connections.Design/methodology/approachThis study employs earnings persistence as measure of earnings quality and ordinary least squares (OLS) model to examine: (1) the moderating effect of institutional investors’ ownership on the association between earnings persistence and PCFs and (2) the association between different types of political connections and earnings persistence.FindingsThis study finds that institutional investors' ownership attenuates weaker earnings quality in PCFs, indicating effective monitoring. However, stronger earnings persistence is associated with PCFs with longer political ties, audited by big four audit firm and with higher CEO power.Originality/valueThis study reveals the lower earnings persistence in PCFs can be attenuated by institutional investors monitoring. However, findings also suggest that earnings persistence in PCFs is affected by duration of political ties, big four audit firm and CEO power. This suggests that PCFs should not be viewed as a homogeneous group of firms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chwee Ming Tee ◽  
Angelina Seow Voon Yee ◽  
Aik Lee Chong

Motivated by recent studies on political connections and stock price crash risk, this study investigates whether there is an association between politically connected (POLCON) firms and stock price crash risk. Further, we examine whether institutional investors’ ownership can moderate this association. Using a dataset of Malaysian firms for the period 2002–2012, we show that POLCON firms are associated with higher risk of stock price crashes. However, the positive association between POLCON and stock crashes is attenuated by higher institutional ownership, implying effective monitoring. Finally, we find that only local institutional investors can significantly mitigate the positive association between POLCON firms and stock price crash risk. This suggests that different types of institutional investors can produce different monitoring outcomes in POLCON firms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (11) ◽  
pp. 1236-1253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chwee Ming Tee

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between politically connected (POLCON) firms and stock price synchronicity, and whether this association can be attenuated by institutional investors. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses an ordinary least square regression model to examine the association between POLCON firms and stock price synchronicity; institutional ownership and stock price synchronicity; the moderating role of institutional ownership on the association between POLCON firms and stock price synchronicity; institutional domiciles and stock price synchronicity; and the moderating role of institutional domiciles on the association between POLCON firms and stock price synchronicity. Findings The result shows that POLCON firms are positively associated with stock price synchronicity. Further, the author also finds that institutional monitoring, through higher ownership by local institutional investors is associated with lower stock price synchronicity. In addition, this study documents evidence that institutional investors, particularly local institutional investors can improve stock price informativeness in POLCON firms. Research limitations/implications The results suggest that POLCON firms are plagued by severe agency problems, resulting in limited flow of firm-specific information to the capital markets. However, the author shows that POLCON firm’s agency problems can be attenuated through effective monitoring by institutional investors. Further, institutional domiciles are shown to be significantly associated with stock price synchronocity. However, effective monitoring is largely driven by local institutional investors, in line with the geographical proximity theory. Practical implications The results suggest that regulators should increase their surveillance and monitoring effort, particularly on firms with close ties to the government. In particular, POLCON firms should be required to be more transparent in their corporate dealings. Additionally, auditors should intensify their audit efforts on POLCON firm to provide more reliable financial information to minority shareholders, investors and analysts. Finally, institutional investors should be incentivized by the Malaysian Securities Commission, via, the code of governance to play an effective monitoring role in Malaysian firms. Originality/value This study reveals that POLCON firms’ severe agency problems can be alleviated by effective institutional monitoring. Further result identifies institutional domiciles as a significant factor in influencing monitoring effectiveness in POLCON firms. This paper provides insights into the dynamic interaction between political connections, institutional monitoring, firm governance and capital markets behavior of an emerging market.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Jebaraj Benjamin ◽  
Mazlina Mat Zain ◽  
Effiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the agency problem of expropriation using dividends in politically connected firms and the relevance of institutional investors in limiting this problem. The growing presence of this group of shareholders offers a unique opportunity to test their importance in the context of dividends payments and expropriation. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the Tobit regression to test the association between political connection, institutional investors and dividend payouts. The results are also robust to the three-stage-least squares regressions method. Findings The study is based on a random sample of 2,458 Malaysian firms-year observations for the period of 2004-2009. The results reveal that politically connected firms have an inclination to pay lower dividends, while institutional ownership is associated with higher dividend payouts. Furthermore, the findings reveal that higher levels of institutional ownership moderates the negative relationship between politically connected firms and dividends. Research implications The findings have an important implication to regulators as it suggests that the institutional investors can influence the dividend payouts in politically connected firms through active monitoring, thus alleviating agency problems. This also provides a positive feedback on the regulators’ governance initiatives that quest to strengthen the roles of institutional investors. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the effectiveness of the monitoring role of institutional investors in the context of expropriation by politically connected firms from the perspective of dividend payouts.


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