Intellectual Property and Market Power in the Seed Industry: The Shifting Foundation of Our Food System

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Matson ◽  
Minli Tang ◽  
Sarah Wynn
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Food System ◽  
Seed Industry

Monopoly Power Corrodes Choice and Resiliency in the Food System

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Woodall ◽  
Tyler L. Shannon
Keyword(s):  
Food Safety ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Food System ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
Grocery Industry ◽  
Size Scale ◽  
Retail Grocery

The wave of mega-mergers sweeping the food, agribusiness, and retail grocery industry from seed to supermarket has accelerated consolidation and concentrated market power in the hands of only a few dominant corporations. Federal regulators have done little to curb the merger mania in these sectors, which will ultimately lower the prices farmers receive for crops and livestock and raise the prices consumers pay for food. But the consolidation also has significantly constrained the range of choices consumers have at the supermarket, prevented independent food innovators from surviving in the marketplace, amplified food safety problems, and presented challenges to the resiliency of the food system itself. This article examines the size, scale, and scope of recent mergers in the food, agribusiness, and grocery retail sectors and discusses the ramifications for consumers, farmers, and the food system.

scholarly journals Applying the rule of per se and rule of reason to assess the violation of the Competition Law by the IPRs owners

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. First
Author(s):  
Bui Thi-Hang Nga
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Right ◽  
Exclusive Right ◽  
Monopoly Position

With the nature of practically irreplaceable and the monopoly of the protection documents, the law has given the intellectual property rights (IPRs) owner a competitive advantage, as well as a market power. As a result, to extent the market power and create a monopoly position to maximize profitability, IPRs owners tend to abuse IPRs to limit competition. Although the exclusive right to IPRs is a legal monopoly comes from protection documents, it does not mean that the owner has the right to abuse this monopoly to limit competition. This is because such behavior is not considered an exception under the Competition Law and shall be prohibited in case the satisfaction of provision violating conditions of the Competition Law. However, in order to balance the interests of related subjects, in assessment of the Competition Law violations of IPRs abuses, the laws of countries fully recognized and applied the rule of reason instead of per ser as Competition Law violations in general. The article aims to analyze and explain the purpose of the application of the rule of reason when assessing the violation of the Competition Law of IPRs owner and when using the per se, in respect of the legal monopoly of the IPRs subjects. The paper then provides proposals to complete the Vietnamese Competition Law which governs the abuse of IPRs owners.

A Model of Forum Shopping

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1091-1113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josh Lerner ◽  
Jean Tirole
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Forum Shopping ◽  
Competing Ideas ◽  
Multiple Categories

Owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea (e.g., authors, security issuers, sponsors of standards) resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users (buyers or adopters) of the worth of their property or idea. We analyze the sponsor's choices of certifier and design, social preferences regarding these choices, and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users, of a downstream presence of the sponsor, and of certifier market power. Finally, we study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing ideas.

Reforming intellectual property rights and the Bt cotton seed industry in China: Who benefits from policy reform?

2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 793-801 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruifa Hu ◽  
Carl Pray ◽  
Jikun Huang ◽  
Scott Rozelle ◽  
Cunhui Fan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Cotton Seed ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Bt Cotton ◽  
Seed Industry

scholarly journals Valuing Intellectual Property Rights in an Imperfectly Competitive Market: A Biopharming Application

2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-583
Author(s):  
Genti Kostandini ◽  
Bradford F. Mills
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Transgenic Tobacco ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Imperfectly Competitive ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Established Firms

Small research firms developing biotechnology applications often focus on establishing intellectual property rights (IPRs), which can then be sold to more established firms with existing market channels. This paper presents a method for valuing the IPRs for an innovation that lowers product production costs below those associated with the patented process of a monopolist. The application to Glucocerebrosidase enzyme from transgenic tobacco suggests an IPRs value of about $1.75 billion. Despite the innovator's market power, significant surplus gains also accrue to consumers. Further, U.S. antitrust laws that prohibit IPRs acquisition by the current monopolist increase consumer welfare by almost 50%.

scholarly journals Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market Power

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Katz
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Economic Rationale ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Relationship

While the economic rationale for intellectual property (“IP”) rights rests on theconcepts of “monopoly” or “market power,” the Supreme Court, in Illinois ToolWorks v. Independent Ink , has recently joined a “virtual consensus” amongantitrust commentators believing that no presumption of market power should existin antitrust cases involving IP. This Article critically analyzes this consensus, andclarifies the relationship between IP and market power, shows why IP rights oftendo confer market power in the antitrust sense, but also explains whyacknowledging this should not necessarily lead to oversized application ofantitrust law to IP.

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