Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea

Earnings management occurs when managers use valuations in financial reporting and in compiling transactions to change financial statements so as to mislead some stakeholders regarding the underlying results that depend on reported accounting figures or to influence contract outcomes that depend on reported accounting figures. The existence of earnings management in a company is inseparable from the various types or underlying motivational factors, while some of the motivations associated with the implementation of earnings management are bonus motivation, political motivation, tax motivation, CEO turnover motivation, IPO motivation. The models used in measuring earnings management include: Healy Model, DeAngelo Model, Jones Model, Industrial Model, Jones Modification Model, Dechow-Dichev Model, Kothari Model and Stubben Model. Keywords : earning management, motivation, measuring models

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Praktik Manajemen Laba dan Reaksi Pasar Setelah Event Pergantian Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

E-Jurnal Akuntansi ◽

10.24843/eja.2021.v31.i04.p01 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 31 (4) ◽

Author(s):

Desak Nyoman Sri Juliartini ◽

Ida Bagus Putra Astika

Keyword(s):

Earnings Management ◽

Chief Executive Officer ◽

Stock Price ◽

Management Practices ◽

Market Reaction ◽

Sampling Technique ◽

Chief Executive ◽

Total Sample ◽

Ceo Turnover ◽

Analysis Technique

This research is to prove after the change of chief executive officer (CEO) of earnings management practices and market reaction. The total sample taken was using the nonprabability sampling method with a purposive sampling technique of 48 companies on the IDX which included the LQ45 index. The analysis technique used is simple linear regression and paired sample t-test on the DA and PER values of the company. Based on the results of the analysis found that there is no effect of earnings management on market reaction after one and two years of CEO turnover. These results prove that there is no important information on the announcement of CEO turnover, so it is less able to make significant stock price fluctuations. The next result is no difference in both earnings management and market reaction that occurs one and two years after CEO turnover. Keywords: Chief Executive Officer (CEO); Earning Management; Market Reaction; Price Earning Ratio (PER).

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CEO Turnover and the Engagement Quality Reviewer’s Audit Effort

Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance ◽

10.1177/0148558x211054999 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 0148558X2110549

Author(s):

Yoo Chan Kim ◽

Jongkyum Kim ◽

Inshik Seol

Keyword(s):

Quality Control ◽

Earnings Management ◽

Review Process ◽

Empirical Investigation ◽

Financial Statements ◽

Ceo Turnover ◽

Detailed Data ◽

Data Set ◽

Audit Risk ◽

Shed Light

Previous literature on the engagement quality (EQ) review argues that EQ reviewers should provide more efforts into the review process when fieldwork auditors’ judgments and conclusions on the financial statements are potentially biased. Little empirical study has been done, however, partly due to the confidentiality of the detailed data on EQ reviewers’ audit hours. The purpose of the article is to shed light on the existing literature by conducting an empirical investigation using a unique actual data set available in Korea. The results show that the EQ review hours are positively associated with CEO turnovers, a proxy for the audit risk, which supports the prediction of the theory on the EQ review. Additional analyses show that such results are stronger under (a) the upward earnings management and (b) the forced CEO turnover. The article extends the existing literature on the EQ review process and enhances the understanding of the engagement-level quality control in the volatile audit environment by providing empirical evidence to the analytic discussions on the EQ review.

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