scholarly journals Location Choices Under Strategic Interactions

Author(s):  
Juan Alcacer
2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Alcácer ◽  
Cristian Dezső ◽  
Minyuan Zhao

Urban Forum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Houshmand Masoumi ◽  
Mohamed R. Ibrahim ◽  
Atif Bilal Aslam

AbstractThe present paper attempts to fill a part of the gap in the studies on residential location choices and their relations to urban mobility, socio-economics, and the built environment by presenting the results of a study on Alexandria, Egypt, by analysing the results of a survey in eight neighbourhoods undertaken in 2015. Four questions were answered in this study: (i) “How are the main drivers behind residential location choices in Alexandria connected to various socio-demographic groups or people with different availability to urban and built environments?”, (ii) “How are the main residential self-selections in Alexandria associated with one another and which are the most important?”, (iii) “How are the housing location-related decisions of Egyptians similar to or different from international decisions?”, and (iv) “How can planners and decision-makers use the knowledge produced by this study for urban planning and housing in Egypt?”. Library work and the results of a Χ2 test of independence show that availability of transportation modes, nice neighbourhoods, and affordability are the strongest motives behind decisions. However, socio-economic factors are generally stronger than urban mobility and spatial issues. These findings are partly different from those of high-income countries.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Petersohn

Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across 11 combat contracts from 2013 to 2019.


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