scholarly journals Buying the Electorate: An Empirical Study of the Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme Court Erred by Not Revisiting Citizens United

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Alan Nelson
Author(s):  
Jan Misiuna

The article presents the history of the US campaign finance law. It describes acts passed by the Congress, starting from the Tillman Act of 1907, followed among others by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and finished with McCain-Feingold Act of 2002. There are also described the most important decisions of the US Supreme Court related to the campaign finance including Newberry vs. United States (256 U. S. 232 (1921)), Buckley v. Valeo (424 U. S. 1 (1976)), McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (540 U. S. 93 (2003)) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)) of 2010. The paper also how has changed the attitude of the Supreme Court towards campaign finance regulation The article also recalls the historical events, such as Teapot Dome Scandal and Watergate, that were important stimuli for passing new law by the Congress. The background of the Supreme Court decisions is also provided.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dante B. Gatmaytan ◽  
Cielo Magno

AbstractThis paper is an empirical study on the nominations and appointments of Supreme Court Justices during a twenty-year period from 1988, when the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) was created in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to 2008. The study examines the profile of individuals nominated by the JBC including their gender, age, geographical origin, academic background, and professional experience. It also explores whether the appointing Presidents display any preferences based on personal characteristics relating the effects of these preferences to the diversity on the Supreme Court. The study indicates that nominees and appointees all hail from the same background. As a result, membership of the Supreme Court is sorely unrepresentative of Philippine society. This study sets the stage for future research that will determine how this lack of diversity on the Supreme Court can affect the resolution of legal issues.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey

Abstract What explains the election of the 45th President of the United States? Many commentators have said that Trump is a fascist. This builds on grave concerns, since Citizens United, that democracy is being corrupted. This article suggests the long term cause, and the shape of ideology is more complex. In 1971, an extraordinary memorandum of Lewis Powell for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged that ‘[b]usiness interests’ should ‘press vigorously in all political arenas for support’. Richard Nixon appointed Powell to the Supreme Court, and a few years later, despite powerful dissent, a majority in Buckley v. Valeo held that candidates may spend unlimited funds on their own political campaigns, a decision of which Donald Trump, and others, have taken full advantage. Citizens United compounded the problems, but Buckley v. Valeo was the ‘Trump for President’ case. This provided a platform from which Trump could propel himself into extensive media coverage. The 2016 election was inseparable from the social ideal pursued by a majority of the Supreme Court since 1976. No modern judiciary had engaged in a more sustained assault on democracy and human rights. Properly understood, ‘fascism’ is a contrasting, hybrid political ideology. It mixes liberalism’s dislike of state intervention, social conservatism’s embrace of welfare provision for insiders (not ‘outsiders’), and collectivism’s view that associations are key actors in a class conflict. Although out of control, Trump is closely linked to neo-conservative politics. It is too hostile to insider welfare to be called ‘fascist’. Its political ideology is weaker. If we had to give it a name, the social ideal of Donald Trump is ‘fascism-lite’.


Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek

The sanctity of political speech is a key element of the U.S. Constitution and a cornerstone of the American republic. When the Supreme Court linked political speech to campaign finance in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision, the modern era of campaign finance regulation was born. In practical terms, this decision meant that in order to pass constitutional muster, any laws limiting money in politics must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling state interest. The lone state interest the Court was willing to entertain was the mitigation of corruption. In order to reach this argument the Court advanced a sophisticated behavioral model, one with key assumptions about how laws will affect voters’ opinions and behavior. These assumptions have received surprisingly little attention in the literature. This book takes up the task of identifying and analyzing empirically the Court’s presumed links between campaign finance regulations and political opinions and behavior. In so doing, we rely on original survey data and experiments from 2009–2016 to openly confront the question of what happens when the Supreme Court is wrong, and when the foundation of over forty years of jurisprudence is simply not true.


Author(s):  
Robert E. Mutch

The point of disclosure is to let voters see who is financing election campaigns. That was why the Supreme Court upheld the disclosure law in Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United, and that was the purpose of the law when...


Author(s):  
Albert J. Rosenthal

In a decision virtually unprecedented in scope, the Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, decided January 30, 1976, has ruled on a wide range of constitutional questions generated by federal campaign finance reform legis lation. In brief, limitations on contributions, reporting and disclosure requirements, and public financing of campaigns have been upheld as at least constitutional on their face, although the door is still open to attacks based on specific evidentiary showings of unconstitutional effects in particular situations. Limitations on expenditures—independently made on behalf of candidates, by candidates themselves out of their own funds, or in the course of the candidates' campaigns—have all been held unconstitutional, as infring ing upon rights under the First Amendment. The choices available for future legislative action, both federal and state, are henceforth likely to be limited in the light of the con straints to be found in the holdings and implications of this case.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasmin Dawood

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in its Citizens United decision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (Harper and Bryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law.


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