Coalition Governments and Fiscal Policy in the Netherlands

I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government.

Download Full-text

Coalition Governments in Combat

NATO in Afghanistan ◽

10.23943/princeton/9780691159386.003.0006 ◽

2014 ◽

Author(s):

David P. Auerswald ◽

Stephen M. Saideman

Keyword(s):

The Netherlands ◽

International Security ◽

Coalition Government ◽

Dutch Government ◽

Coalition Governments ◽

Security Assistance ◽

International Security Assistance Force

This chapter examines parliamentary coalition governments. Leaders in coalition governments face great challenges, not least because members of the coalition will vary in their enthusiasm for the mission. As a result, most countries in this category have tended to place more significant restrictions upon their forces in Afghanistan. The chapter considers three key cases in detail. Germany has been the exemplar of a country viewed as being far more capable in theory than in practice due to the restrictions imposed by a series of coalition governments. The Netherlands illustrates the domestic consequences of a coalition government fighting a war, as the Dutch government collapsed over Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Denmark is quite exceptional: the Danes fought with few restrictions in the most dangerous part of the most dangerous province in Afghanistan. The chapter then briefly examines other coalition governments in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force): Belgium, Italy, and Norway.

Download Full-text

Differing European Unemployment Rates: the Case of the Netherlands and Norway

Journal of Public Policy ◽

10.1017/s0143814x00005365 ◽

1991 ◽

Vol 11 (3) ◽

pp. 331-343 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Gunnar Fløystad

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Policy ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Interest Rates ◽

Real Wage ◽

Wage Rigidity ◽

Unemployment Rates ◽

Relative Wages ◽

Supply Shocks ◽

The Difference ◽

Real Wage Rigidity

ABSTRACTIn discussing unemployment problems the current literature tends to emphasise supply shocks and real wage rigidity, hysteresis, failure of relative wages to adjust to market conditions and labour market regulations as important reasons of unemployment. By making a comparative study of the unemployment problems in the Netherlands and Norway, this study emphasises the protection of industries, real interest rates and government fiscal policy as important factors explaining the difference in unemployment between the two countries.

Download Full-text

The dynamics of coalition governments in the Netherlands

Coalition Government as a Reflection of a Nation’s Politics and Society ◽

10.4324/9780429422379-4 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 45-63

Author(s):

Arco Timmermans ◽

Gerard Breeman

Keyword(s):

The Netherlands ◽

Coalition Governments

Download Full-text

Estates and Demons

10.1093/oso/9780198800149.003.0007 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Howell A. Lloyd

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Policy ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Critical Evaluation ◽

Discussion Group

A brief account of Bodin’s presence at Henri III’s discussion group, the ‘Académie du Palais’, prefaces a review of the Angevin’s activities as a deputy at the Blois Estates-general (1576), an assembly convened amid confrontation, in France between the newly formed Catholic League and the Huguenot confederacy, and in Europe at large between Spain’s regime in the Netherlands and rebels against that regime. Based primarily on Bodin’s own journal of the Estates, the review highlights the debates at the assembly over religious and fiscal policy, in both of which the Angevin made significant interventions. The chapter then notes his association with the Duke of Anjou and the so-called politiques, before embarking on a substantial account followed by a critical evaluation of his notorious work on witchcraft, the Démonomanie.

Download Full-text

Fiscal policy and greenhouse gases: the case of the Netherlands

Ecological Economics ◽

10.1016/0921-8009(96)00037-7 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 18 (3) ◽

pp. 231-241 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Fouad Laroui ◽

Marko J. van Leeuwen

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Policy ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Greenhouse Gases

Download Full-text

Is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in the Euro Area?

German Economic Review ◽

10.1111/geer.12000 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 14 (1) ◽

pp. 73-88 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Florence Huart

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Policy ◽

The Netherlands ◽

Euro Area ◽

Oecd Countries ◽

Discretionary Fiscal Policy ◽

Significant Case ◽

The Relationship ◽

Public Deficits ◽

Public Debts

Abstract We test the relationship between the cyclically adjusted primary balance and alternative indicators of cyclical conditions for the euro area and 18 OECD countries over the period 1970-2009. A countercyclical stance of discretionary fiscal policy is found during bad times after 1999 in the euro area as a whole and in a few member countries only (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). It is also associated with high public deficits or low public debts. There is no significant case of procyclical fiscal policy after 1999, neither in good times nor in bad times.

Download Full-text