Fiscal Federalism, Jurisdictional Competition and Tax Coordination: Translating Theory to Policy in the European Union

Author(s):  
William W. Bratton ◽  
Joseph A. McCahery
Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini

This chapter focuses on the European Union after Brexit and articulates the case for constitutional reforms. Reforms are necessary to address the substantive and institutional shortcomings that patently emerged in the context of Europe’s old and new crises. Moreover, reforms will be compelled by the exigencies of the post-Covid-19 EU recovery, which pushes the EU towards new horizons in terms of fiscal federalism and democratic governance. As a result, the chapter considers both obstacles and opportunities to reform the EU and make it more effective and legitimate. On the one hand, it underlines the difficulties connected to the EU treaty amendment procedure, owing to the requirement of unanimous approval of any treaty change, and the consequential problem of the veto. On the other hand, it emphasizes the increasing practice by Member States to use intergovernmental agreements outside the EU legal order and stresses that these have set new rules on their entry into force which overcome state veto, suggesting that this is now a precedent to consider.


2016 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 39-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg

The European Union budget is small and fulfils only a limited range of functions, yet it provokes regular disputes among the Member States and institutions of the Union. This paper describes the structure of the budget and shows that standard theories, such as fiscal federalism, are not well-suited to analysing how the EU budget operates or the political economy behind it. The paper then looks at how much the UK contributes towards the EU budget and explains why some of the claims made about it in the public discourse are inaccurate.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document