Can the Federal Republic of Germany be Sued in Poland - Remarks on International Court of Justice Judgment from 2012r and the Supreme Court Judgment in Poland from 2010r

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Jerzy Gruszczynski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Republic ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Justice Judgment

scholarly journals Revitalizing The U.S. Compliance Power

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Obligation ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The U.S

Although “[tjreaties are the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts,” the president and the courts may sometimes be powerless to achieve compliance with a U.S. treaty. That was the puzzling outcome of Medellin v. Texas. Even though the Supreme Court declared that the United States has an international obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court invalidated the president’s memorandum directing Texas and other errant states to comply.

Less Than Zero?

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Manuel Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
First Case ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Agreements ◽  
The Law

Medellín v. Texas is the first case in which the Supreme Court has denied a treaty-based claim solely on the ground that the treaty relied upon was non-self-executing. In Foster v. Neilson, the only other case in which the Court had denied relief on this ground, the Court offered its view that the treaty was non-self-executing as an alternative ground for denying relief. The Court soon thereafter disavowed its conclusion that the treaty involved in Foster was non-selfexecuting, and, in the intervening years, it repeatedly declined invitations to deny relief on this or related grounds. Many observers (including me) thought that the Court would again skirt a ruling on non-self-execution in Medellín because the president had issued a memorandum ordering compliance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Avena. After all, the Court in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi had recently struck down a California law on the ground that it conflicted with a “policy” reflected in certain sole executive agreements. The president in Medellín seemed to be standing on stronger ground, as he was insisting that state law give way to an obligation imposed by a treaty that had received the consent of the Senate and was accordingly the supreme law of the land. But the Court defied this expectation, with potentially regrettable results for the law of treaties.

scholarly journals Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-901
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Geoffrey R. Watson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Israeli Government ◽  
Israeli Supreme Court

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.

scholarly journals Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance With ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Manuel Vázquez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Clinton Administration ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Postponement ◽  
Take All

Among the puzzling aspects of the Breard episode was the Clinton administration’s claim that the decision whether or not to comply with the Order of the International Court of Justice requiring the postponement of Breard’s execution lay exclusively in the hands of the Governor of Virginia. The ICJ’s Order provided that “[t]he United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings.” The Clinton administration argued that the Order was not binding, but it also took the position that, even if the order were binding, there would be no authority in the federal Government to require a postponement of the execution. As the administration explained to the Supreme Court:

The Justiciability of Paraguay’s Claim of Treaty Violation

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Government’s position asserting nonjusticiability of the treaty claims raised by Paraguay in the domestic and international lawsuits is disturbing. The Government’s amicus filings at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court denied that Paraguay’s claims belonged in federal court (or indeed in any court at all); at die International Court of Justice, the United States admitted a treaty violation but denied the competence of that tribunal to enter a judicial remedy. At one or another phase of these proceedings, the U.S. Government pressed a variety of arguments that (if accepted) would rule out virtually any judicial consideration of a treaty-based claim. The haste with which the Supreme Court denied a stay in Breard’s case foreclosed adequate consideration of the justiciability of such claims in domestic courts and also effectively barred Paraguay from achieving the relief it sought on the international plane.

Case Analysis: Comment on the Genocide Case (Preliminary Objections)

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-172
Author(s):  
Paul C. Szaz
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court

On 11 July 1996, the International Court of Justice, in its third Substantive decision and first Judgment in respect of the dispute brought before it by Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia or BH) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia or FRY) under Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dismissed all the preliminary objections that had been raised by Yugoslavia, as well as several additional bases of jurisdiction invoked by Bosnia. The Court also found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and that the application filed by Bosnia on 20 March 1993 was admissible. It thus positioned itself, over three years after the application had been filed, to resume the proceedings to consider the case on its merits, though still on an somewhat lcisurely schedule.

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