scholarly journals The Re fined Best-Response Correspondence in Normal Form Games

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Balkenborg ◽  
Josef Hofbauer ◽  
Christoph Kuzmics
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Best Response Correspondence

scholarly journals The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Balkenborg ◽  
Josef Hofbauer ◽  
Christoph Kuzmics
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Best Response Correspondence

Quantal Response Equilibrium in Normal-Form Games

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Cost Model ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Control Cost ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Best Response

This chapter lays out the general theory of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) for normal-form games. It starts with the reduced-form approach to QR, based on the direct specification of “regular” quantal or smoothed best-response functions required to satisfy four intuitive axioms of stochastic choice. A simple asymmetric matching pennies game is used to illustrate these ideas and show that QRE imposes strong restrictions on the data, even without parametric assumptions on the quantal response functions. Particular attention is given to the logit QRE, since it is the most commonly used approach taken when QRE is applied to experimental or other data. The discussion includes the topological and limiting properties of logit QRE and connections with refinement concepts. QRE is also related to several other equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior in games, including a game-theoretic equilibrium version of Luce's (1959) model of individual choice, Rosenthal's (1989) linear response model, and Van Damme's (1987) control cost model; these connections are explained in the chapter.

scholarly journals Opponent learning awareness and modelling in multi-objective normal form games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxana Rădulescu ◽  
Timothy Verstraeten ◽  
Yijie Zhang ◽  
Patrick Mannion ◽  
Diederik M. Roijers ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Multi Objective

scholarly journals Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

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