scholarly journals Adverse Selection in Private Annuity Markets and the Role of Mandatory Social Annuitization

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben J. Heijdra ◽  
Laurie S.M. Reijnders
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Annuity Markets

scholarly journals Adverse Selection in Private Annuity Markets and the Role of Mandatory Social Annuitization

De Economist ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 160 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben J. Heijdra ◽  
Laurie S. M. Reijnders
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Annuity Markets

The Role of Behavioral Frictions in Health Insurance Marketplace Enrollment and Risk: Evidence from a Field Experiment

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (5) ◽  
pp. 1549-1574
Author(s):  
Richard Domurat ◽  
Isaac Menashe ◽  
Wesley Yin
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Positive Selection ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Market Risk ◽  
Selection Model ◽  
Heterogeneous Effects ◽  
Low Income Consumers

We experimentally varied information mailed to 87,000 households in California’s health insurance marketplace to study the role of frictions in insurance take-up. Reminders about the enrollment deadline raised enrollment by 1.3 pp (16 percent) in this typically low take-up population. Heterogeneous effects of personalized subsidy information indicate misperceptions about program benefits. Consistent with an adverse selection model with frictional enrollment costs, the intervention lowered average spending risk by 5.1 percent, implying that marginal respondents were 37 percent less costly than inframarginal consumers. We observe the largest positive selection among low income consumers, who exhibit the largest frictions in enrollment. Finally, we estimate the implied value of the letter intervention to be $25 to $53 per month in subsidy dollars. These results suggest that frictions may partially explain low take-up for marketplace insurance, and that interventions reducing them can improve enrollment and market risk in exchanges. (JEL C93, G22, G52, H75, I13)

The Role of Annuity Markets in Financing Retirement

ILR Review ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 185
Author(s):  
P. Brett Hammond ◽  
Jeffrey R. Brown ◽  
Olivia S. Mitchell ◽  
James M. Poterba ◽  
Mark J. Warshawsky
Keyword(s):  
Annuity Markets

scholarly journals The Role of Behavioral Health Diagnoses in Adverse Selection

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (9) ◽  
pp. 920-927
Author(s):  
Michelle S. Keller ◽  
Haiyong Xu ◽  
Francisca Azocar ◽  
Susan L. Ettner
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Health ◽  
Adverse Selection

scholarly journals Contagious Adverse Selection

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Morris ◽  
Hyun Song Shin
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Upper Bound ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Asset Market ◽  
Small Probability ◽  
Corrosive Effect ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

We illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and show how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of “market confidence,” defined as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. Small probability events can unravel market confidence. We discuss the role of contagious adverse selection and the problem of “toxic assets” in the recent financial crisis. (JEL D82, G01, G12, G14)

scholarly journals Sistem Informasi Dalam Hubungan Prinsipal – Agen Di RSU-BLUD Bahteramas, Kota Kendari Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-85
Author(s):  
Zainul Abidin
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Conventional Systems ◽  
Reporting Procedures

 This study aims to analyze the information systems that occur, especially in terms of reporting procedures, budgeting systems and the role of the supervisory board at the Bahteramas Hospital, Kendari City, Southeast Sulawesi Province. This research uses a qualitative approach. The results show that the reporting procedure uses a combination of computers and manuals, but manual systems are still dominant. The budgeting system still uses conventional systems and also uses performance-based budgets. The supervisory board has carried out its duties, but it is still not optimal. Even so, there is complete information where the principal knows what the agent is doing. Even though in reality, there are still agency problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) both potentially and factually. For example, negligence in the supply of drugs, but on the whole does not hinder the disclosure of information by the principal.

The revelation principle and mechanism design

2020 ◽  
pp. 661-719
Author(s):  
David M. Kreps
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Gains From Trade ◽  
Revelation Principle ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Government ◽  
Role Of The Government

This chapter evaluates a more general attack on optimal contract and mechanism design stressing cases of adverse selection, which makes use of the revelation principle. One should be clear about the uses to which the revelation principle is put. It can be thought of as a statement about how actually to implement contracts. But it may be better to use it with greater circumspection as a tool of analysis for finding the limits of what outcomes can be implemented, without reference to how best to implement a particular outcome. In some contexts of direct revelation, there will be situations ex post where the party in the role of the government knows that it can obtain further gains from trade from one or more of the parties who participated. Meanwhile, in many applications of the revelation principle, the party in the role of mechanism designer must be able to commit credibly to no subsequent (re)negotiation once it learns the types of the parties with which it is dealing.

Sizing Up Categories

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Lee Anne Fennell
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Classification System ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Category Membership ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
The World ◽  
Correlated Risks

Abstract Categories intentionally create discontinuities. By breaking the world up into cognizable chunks, they simplify the information environment. But the signals they provide may be inaccurate or scrambled by strategic behavior. This Article considers how law might approach the problem of optimal categorization, given the role of categories in managing and transmitting information. It proceeds from the observation that high categorization costs can be addressed through two opposite strategies—making classifications more fine-grained (splitting), and making classifications more encompassing (lumping). Although continuizing and other forms of splitting offer intuitive answers to inaccurate classification and gaming along category lines, lumping is sometimes a better solution. If category membership carries multiple and offsetting implications, the incentive to manipulate the classification system is dampened. To take a simple example, insurance that covers only one risk is more vulnerable to adverse selection than is an insurance arrangement that covers two inversely correlated risks. Making categories larger, more durable, and more heterogeneous can produce such offsets. These and other forms of bundling can arrest damaging instabilities in categorization.

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