scholarly journals Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Magee
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Policy Choices

Political Action Committees

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Mutch
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Party Organizations

Non-party organizations form political action committees (PACs) to make the campaign contributions the FECA bans them from making themselves. The FEC defines every PAC as belonging to one of two broad categories: connected and nonconnected. Nearly all connected PACs were formed by corporations, trade...

scholarly journals Political Action Committees in State Elections

1995 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 61-77
Author(s):  
James D. King ◽  
Helenan S. Robin
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Direct Mail ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
The Past

While the number o f state PACs and their campaign contributions have increased substantially over the past decade, much remains unknown regarding their organization and activities. From a survey o f PACs in three states we develop a portrait o f political action committees, which extends beyond contributions. State PACs form around both economic and ideological issues; have very modest organizational structures; solicit funds primarily by direct mail and personal contacts; typically delegate responsibility for making campaign contributions to committees, which adopt accommodationist strategies; and have extended their activities to include voter education and mobilization. A number o f differences among the various types o f PACs are also evident.

Lobbying and Opposition to SFAS No. 123(R): An Examination of Campaign Contributions from CEOs and PACs

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-124
Author(s):  
Cristi A. Gleason ◽  
Matthew Glendening
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Employee Stock Options ◽  
Shareholder Proposals

SYNOPSIS We examine the contributions of CEOs and company-affiliated political action committees (PACs) to members of Congress who supported a moratorium on the Financial Accounting Standards Board's 2003 proposed standard to require firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. Our evidence—based on a sample of firms targeted by shareholder proposals to voluntarily expense employee stock options—indicates that CEOs and PACs had different motivations for lobbying on this policy issue. Specifically, we find that opposition to shareholder proposals varies positively with CEOs' contributions to the moratorium co-sponsors. However, opposition varies positively with PAC contributions to co-sponsors only when the targeted CEO contributes to the PAC. These results suggest that CEO lobbying relates more to executives' interests to preserve excessive pay, whereas PAC lobbying relates more to interests in preserving the level of earnings.

scholarly journals Do Campaign Contributions from Farmers Influence Agricultural Policy? Evidence from a 2008 Farm Bill Amendment Vote to Curtail Cotton Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-433
Author(s):  
Scott Callahan
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Farm Bill ◽  
Vote Decision ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Cotton Farmers ◽  
Simultaneous Model

AbstractThis article studies the political activities of individual cotton farmers and cotton political action committees (PACs) by exploiting a vote to amend the 2008 Farm Bill. Using a simultaneous model, I estimate reduced form equations for donations from cotton farmers and cotton PACs using tobit models, which instrument donations in the probit vote equation to control for the hypothesized endogeneity between campaign contributions and legislative votes. I find evidence that cotton farmers, like cotton PACs, contribute to legislators representing a median cotton farming constituency. I find no evidence that contributions from cotton farmers or cotton PACs significantly affected the vote decision.

Differences in Campaign Funds: A Racial Explanation

1986 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Theilmann ◽  
Al Wilhite
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Black Candidates ◽  
The U.S

Black candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives receive substantially lower levels of campaign contributions than non-black candidates. This article investigates the reason for this discrepancy. Are blacks discriminated against or do they receive less money because they are riskier candidates? The results suggest that blacks do receive less money because of their race and that the source of the funds is important. Political action committees and political parties tend to discriminate but individual contributors do not.

The Impact of Citizens United on Large Corporations and Their Employees

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy L. Hansen ◽  
Michael S. Rocca
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Fortune 500 ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
Fortune 500 Companies ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Super Pac ◽  
The Impact

The goal of this research is to determine whether the Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 Citizens United ruling changed the contribution strategies of employees of major corporations. Using an original dataset of campaign contributions by employees of Fortune 500 companies, we analyze the contribution strategies of these individuals in the 2008 and 2012 presidential election cycles. Overall, our results suggest three important conclusions. First, Citizens United did not alter Fortune 500 employees’ contribution patterns to traditional political committees. However, the emergence of Super political action committees (PAC) in 2012 may have pulled employees’ contributions from 527 groups, at least in the short term. Second, we find large differences in contributions across resources, and the differences become even more dramatic after Citizens United when CEOs contributed millions to Super PACs. Finally, Fortune 500 employee contributions to traditional political committees still outweigh Super PAC contributions in both numbers and amount. And, importantly, employees of the world’s largest corporations were not the driving force behind the increase in spending after Citizens United.

scholarly journals Transparency or Deception? How Rejecting PAC Contributions Affects Contribution Patterns

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Congressional Election ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Corporate Political Action ◽  
Using Data

A growing trend among Congressional and presidential candidates is to reject campaign contributions from corporate Political Action Committees (PACs). Although positioned as an effort to increase democratic transparency, researchers have yet to examine how these pledges affect contribution patterns. Using data on Democratic candidates in the 2018 Congressional election, I find that although pledging to reject corporate PAC contributions is associated with decreases in contributions from ideological, labor, and business PACs, taking the pledge is also associated with increases in contributions from political PACs and individuals. Increases in individual contributions include small-dollar donations and donations from individuals affiliated ideological and business interests. Additionally, I find that pledging to reject PAC contributions has no electoral benefits. This is the first study to examine the effects of rejecting PAC contributions on contribution patterns, and the first test of the claim that making this pledge will increase small-dollar donations.

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