Is the Health Insurance Individual Mandate 'Unprecedented?': The Case of Auto Insurance Mandates

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Wriggins
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Auto Insurance ◽  
Insurance Mandates ◽  
Individual Mandate

scholarly journals The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance

2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (S2) ◽  
pp. 38-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Hall
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Health Insurance ◽  
Private Health Insurance ◽  
Health Care Finance ◽  
Insurance Mandates ◽  
Public Program ◽  
Individual Mandate ◽  
Minor Children ◽  
Compulsory Health Insurance ◽  
Small Employers

Many proposals to reform health care finance and delivery require individuals or private employers to pay for private health insurance. Senators Ron Wyden and Robert Bennett’s Healthy Americans Act, for instance, would require every adult person who is not covered by a public program to purchase health insurance. Similarly, President Obama’s campaign proposal requires that parents arrange for coverage of their minor children and that all but small employers pay a tax if they do not provide their workers health insurance.This paper addresses the constitutionality of such proposals. Compulsory health insurance might raise constitutional concerns because there is no existing social legislation that serves as a perfect legal analogy to an individual mandate for private health insurance. Insurance mandates are familiar in other contexts, such as automobile liability, but they present an easier case for constitutionality because they are a condition of exercising a privilege, such as driving a car.

scholarly journals Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison K. Hoffman
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Medical Care ◽  
Health Reform ◽  
Care Delivery ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Insurance Market ◽  
Insurance Reform ◽  
Health Insurance Reform ◽  
Individual Mandate ◽  
Policy Objectives

AbstractThe 2010 federal health insurance reform act includes an individual mandate that will require Americans to carry health insurance. This article argues that even if the mandate were to catalyze universal health insurance coverage, it will fall short on some of the policy objectives many hope to achieve through a mandate if implemented in a fragmented insurance market. To uncover this problem, this article sets forth a novel framework that disentangles three different policy objectives the individual mandate can serve. Namely, supporters of the mandate might hope for it to: (1) facilitate greater health and financial security for the uninsured (“paternalism”); (2) eliminate inefficiencies in health care delivery and financing (“efficiency”); and/or (3) require the healthy to buy insurance to help fund medical care for the sick (“health redistribution”). Health redistribution — the primary focus of this article — is a shifting of wealth from the healthy to the sick through the mechanism of risk pooling. Many see health redistribution as a means to enable all Americans to more equitably access medical care on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of ability or willingness to pay.Drawing on evidence from the implementation of an individual mandate in Massachusetts's health reform in 2006, this article reveals that the fragmented American health insurance market will thwart the mandate's ability to achieve these objectives— in particular the goal of health redistribution. Fragmentation is an atomization of the insurance market into numerous risk pools that has been driven by market competition and regulation. It prevents Americans from sharing broadly in the risk of poor health and, in doing so, entrenches a system where access to medical care remains tied to ability to pay and individualized characteristics. The final section of this article examines how various policies, including some in the new law (e.g., insurance regulation and exchanges) and others not (e.g., expanded public insurance), can reduce fragmentation so that the mandate can successfully serve all desired objectives and in the process gain greater legitimacy over time.

The Individual Health Insurance Mandate and Veterans Health Coverage

2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongjin Oh ◽  
Frances Stokes Berry
Keyword(s):  
Health Insurance ◽  
Safety Net ◽  
Veterans Health ◽  
Health Coverage ◽  
Health Administration ◽  
Social Safety Net ◽  
Individual Mandate ◽  
Insurance Mandate ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Veteran Health Care

In December 2017, Congress repealed the individual insurance mandate penalty. Given the poor health status of veterans, their higher demands for health insurance, and the substantial number of uninsured veterans, the repeal of the individual mandate should have a significant impact on the veterans. This article investigates how the repeal of the individual mandate effective in January 2019 is likely to affect the number of uninsured veterans and their enrollments in Veterans Affairs (VA) insurance. By analyzing 52,692 nonelderly veterans in Florida and California from 2008 to 2017, the findings suggest that the repeal will lead to a considerable increase in the number of uninsured veterans. Veterans who are unemployed, poor, and suffering disabilities are more likely to sign up for the VA insurance than better-off veterans. Thus, one of the important functions of veteran health care is to serve as a social safety net for vulnerable veterans. Thus, the Veterans Health Administration should establish a policy to minimize the expected negative repercussions of the repeal.

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