The Constitution of Economic Growth: Testing the Prosperity Effects of Property Rights and Veto Players on a Panel of Countries 1980-2000

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard ◽  
Mogens K. Justesen
2010 ◽  
pp. 39-55
Author(s):  
M. Ellman

This article is an overview of the contribution made by economic Sovietology to mainstream economics. The long debate about the universal applicability of mainstream economics is reconsidered in the light of the Soviet experience. Information is provided on the contribution of the study of the Soviet economy to fields as diverse as the measurement of economic growth, institutional economics, economic administration, the economics of property rights, the economics of the informal sector, the economics of famines, the Austrian critique of general equilibrium theory, and incentives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Zonglai Kou ◽  
Xilin Wang

Abstract This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis of the effects of intellectual property rights on the take-off of an economy from an era of stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. We incorporate patent protection into a Schumpeterian growth model in which take-off occurs when the population size crosses an endogenous threshold. We find that strengthening patent protection has contrasting effects on economic growth at different stages of development. Specifically, it leads to an earlier take-off but also reduces economic growth in the long run.


1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Leblang

Author(s):  
Ilke Civelekoglu ◽  
Basak Ozoral

In an attempt to discuss neoliberalism with a reference to new institutional economics, this chapter problematizes the role of formal institutions in the neoliberal age by focusing on a specific type of formal institution, namely property rights in developing countries. New institutional economics (NIE) argues that secure property rights are important as they guarantee investments and thus, promote economic growth. This chapter discusses why the protection of property rights is weak and ineffective in certain developing countries despite their endorsement of neoliberalism by shedding light on the link between the institutional structure of the state and neoliberalism in the developing world. With the political economy perspective, the chapter aims to build a bridge between NIE and political economy, and thereby providing fertile ground for the advancement of NIE.


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