Managing Agency Problems in Early Shareholder Capitalism: An Exploration of Liverpool Shipping, 1744-1785

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian S. Silverman ◽  
Paul L. Ingram
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems ◽  
Shareholder Capitalism

Corporate Governance and Family-owned Companies

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prem Sikka
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Shareholder Capitalism ◽  
And Control

It is often claimed that the ownership structure and the close involvement of family members alleviates agency problems and gives them a long-term orientation compared to a corporation with dispersed shareholding and control. Through a case study relating to the demise of BHS, one of the biggest UK retailers, the chapter probes these claims. BHS was an epitome of shareholder capitalism. It was owned and controlled by Sir Philip Green and his family. The control enabled the Green family to extract large amounts of cash from BHS through dividends and complex intragroup transactions, with virtually no questions from board members, regulators or auditors. The flawed corporate governance of BHS inflicted considerable hardship on other stakeholders. The demise of BHS should encourage reflections on the claims (agency theory) that an alignment of the interests of shareholders and directors somehow leads to better governance and socially responsible management.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall K. Morck ◽  
Bernard Yin Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems
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