scholarly journals Dividend Policy, Corporate Control and the Tax Status of the Controlling Shareholder

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Andres ◽  
André Betzer ◽  
Marc Goergen
Keyword(s):  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Tax Status

scholarly journals Dividend policy, corporate control and the tax status of the controlling shareholder

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Andres ◽  
André Betzer ◽  
Inga van den Bongard ◽  
Marc Goergen
Keyword(s):  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Tax Status

Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control: The Case of Going Private

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moran Ofir
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Quarterly Journal ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Going Private ◽  
A Company

Abstract I analyze the legal rules governing the sale-of-corporate-control in the case of going private transactions and examine whether a controlling shareholder must share the premium associated with sale-of-control. I rely on the framework developed in (Bebchuk, L.A. 1994. “Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control,” 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics 957–993) regarding these transactions under the adjusted market rule (AMR) enabling different rights for the controlling and minority shareholders, and under the adjusted equal opportunity rule (AEOR) providing equal rights to the minorities and controller. My main findings are that both rules prevent inefficient transfers, since under both the new controller fully internalizes the externality imposed by extracting private benefits of control. However, the AMR is superior in facilitating efficient transfers. This is because the AEOR can prevent efficient transfers, due to the higher price demanded from the buyer in order to compensate both controller and minorities. In consequence, overall, the AMR dominates the AEOR for transactions in which a company is taken private.

The Effect of Shareholder-Level Dividend Taxes on Stock Prices: Evidence from the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 933-947 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ayers ◽  
C. Bryan Cloyd ◽  
John R. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Dividend Yield ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Status ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Dividend Taxes

We investigate the effect of an increase in the individual (shareholder-level) income tax rate on share values. We regress cumulative daily abnormal stock returns surrounding the passage of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 on firm dividend yield, tax status of the investor as represented by level of institutional ownership, the interaction of these two variables, and control variables. Consistent with our expectations, we find that (1) the higher the firm's dividend yield, the more negative the firm's stock price reaction to the increase in the individual income tax rate (i.e., the dividend tax rate) enacted in the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, and (2) institutional holdings mitigate this negative reaction. Our results suggest that both the dividend policy of the firm and the tax status of the marginal investor influence the extent to which dividend taxes are reflected in share values. Our evidence is consistent with the traditional view that firm dividend policy influences the extent to which tax rate changes affect share values.

Dividend Policy, Corporate Control, and Tax Clienteles

2004 ◽  
pp. 124-155
Author(s):  
Luis Correia Da Silva ◽  
Marc Goergen ◽  
Luc Renneboog
Keyword(s):  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Corporate Control

Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies

2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gongmeng Chen ◽  
Michael Firth ◽  
Yu Xin ◽  
Liping Xu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Positive Performance ◽  
Performance Effects ◽  
Private Entity ◽  
Ownership Reform

AbstractWe investigate performance effects for China's listed firms when there is a change in the controlling shareholder. These changes include ownership transfers from one state entity to another state entity and from a state entity to a private entity. We find positive performance effects when control is passed to a private entity. In contrast, when the transfer is made to another branch of the state, there is little change in performance. The stock market responds positively to a change in control, with the largest effect observed for private transfers. Our results suggest the Chinese government should continue to sell down its share ownership in listed firms as the transfer of control to private owners enhances corporate profitability and efficiency. Moreover, to help ownership reform, China should encourage an active market for corporate control.

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