Incentive Alignment Through Shareholder Proposals on Management Compensation and its Bond Market Reaction: A Creditor’s Perspective

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Fortin ◽  
Sanjian Bill Zhang ◽  
Chandra Subramaniam ◽  
Frank Wang
2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Fortin ◽  
Chandra Subramaniam ◽  
Xu (Frank) Wang ◽  
Sanjian (Bill) Zhang

Author(s):  
Steve Fortin ◽  
Chandra Subramaniam ◽  
Frank Wang ◽  
Sanjian Bill Zhang

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takeshi Nishikawa ◽  
Andrew K. Prevost ◽  
Ramesh P. Rao

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 911-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark L. Defond ◽  
Jieying Zhang
Keyword(s):  

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark L. DeFond ◽  
Mingyi Hung ◽  
Emre Carr ◽  
Jieying Zhang

SYNOPSIS We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate bondholder value by examining the bond market reaction to news events leading up to the passage of SOX. The net impact of SOX on bondholder value is difficult to predict, and there are many reasons why it may be viewed as either good or bad news. Our primary analysis reveals a significant decline in average bondholder value around these events. In addition, cross-sectional tests find that the decline is significantly larger among riskier bonds and among bonds held by firms that are expected to experience the greatest changes under SOX. Thus, our findings are consistent with the bond market expecting the exogenously imposed changes under SOX to make bondholders worse off.


Author(s):  
Tara Bhandari ◽  
Peter Iliev ◽  
Jonathan Kalodimos

Abstract We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already-well-governed firms.


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