New Evidence on Procyclical Bank Capital Regulation: The Role of Bank Loan Commitments

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ki Young Park
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Loan Commitments ◽  
Bank Capital Regulation ◽  
New Evidence

scholarly journals Provisioning, Bank Behavior and Financial Crisis: Evidence from GCC Banks

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Saibal Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Bank Loan ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Minimum Capital ◽  
Loan Loss Provisions ◽  
Bank Capital Regulation ◽  
Bank Behavior ◽  
Using Data

AbstractThe debate on bank capital regulation has in recent years devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions play as a part of the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. Using data for 1996–2011, we find evidence in favor of both capital management and signaling behavior by GCC banks. Islamic banks appear to engage less in such behavior as compared to their non-Islamic counterparts.

scholarly journals A Macroeconomic Model With Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 1361-1418
Author(s):  
Vadim Elenev ◽  
Tim Landvoigt ◽  
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crises ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Financial Fragility ◽  
Financial Intermediaries ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Sharp Change ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Bank Capital Regulation

How much capital should financial intermediaries hold? We propose a general equilibrium model with a financial sector that makes risky long‐term loans to firms, funded by deposits from savers. Government guarantees create a role for bank capital regulation. The model captures the sharp and persistent drop in macro‐economic aggregates and credit provision as well as the sharp change in credit spreads observed during financial crises. Policies requiring intermediaries to hold more capital reduce financial fragility, reduce the size of the financial and non‐financial sectors, and lower intermediary profits. They redistribute wealth from savers to the owners of banks and non‐financial firms. Pre‐crisis capital requirements are close to optimal. Counter‐cyclical capital requirements increase welfare.

scholarly journals Dimensions of bank capital regulation: A cross-country analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matej Marinc ◽  
Mojmir Mrak ◽  
Vasja Rant
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Bank Capital Regulation ◽  
Country Analysis ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
The Eu

This paper identifies the main dimensions of capital regulation. We use survey data from 142 countries from the World Bank?s (2013) database covering various aspects of bank regulation. Using multiple explorative factor analysis, we identify two main dimensions of capital regulation: complexity of capital regulation and stringency of capital regulation. We show that even countries with a common legal and regulatory framework differ substantially in terms of capital regulation. For example, the level of stringency of capital regulation varies substantially across the EU countries, potentially distorting the level playing field.

scholarly journals INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR BANK CAPITAL REGULATION

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (36) ◽  
pp. 35-45
Author(s):  
V. Kovalenko ◽  
S. Sheludko ◽  
N. Radova ◽  
F. Murshudli ◽  
K. Gonchar
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Capital Adequacy ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Bank Capital Regulation

The paper analyzes the evolution of the introduction of international standards for bank capital regulation. The aim of the research is to study international standards for bank capital regulation and their impact on financial stability and sustainability of domestic banking systems. The 2007—2009 Global Financial Crisis was perhaps the greatest banking and financial crisis since bank failures and the financial panic of the Great Depression in early 1930s. According to academics and professionals, there has been much debate over the last decade as to whether the 2007—2009 banking crisis was primarily a solvency crisis or a liquidity crisis. Capital adequacy of banks today is the main indicator of increasing society’s confidence in banking systems. The flexible and balanced implementation of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) recommendations on the assessment of bank capital adequacy is of particular importance in the context of the deepening economic crisis caused by COVID-19 quarantine restrictions. Regulation of bank capital is primarily settles by the ability to execute basic functions inherent in it. A number of shocks in connection with the crisis require the renewal and search for a new paradigm of regulation, which today is focused on achieving financial stability, overcoming pro-cyclicality, especially in the banking sector. One of the latest developments in the field of bank capital regulation has been the implementation of international banking supervision standards recommended by BCBS, which have been transformed from Basel I, Basel II, Basel III, Basel 3.5 to Basel IV. The new ideology suggests that in times of financial and economic crisis or in anticipation of growing uncertainty in the economy, it is necessary to abandon the idea of bank capital management and the creation of financial reserves to maintain liquidity and stability of financial institutions. These measures will not be able to protect the bank from default and bankruptcy. This ideology has become a new paradigm of effective banking regulation, which can be formulated as an accepted set of three vectors: risk; risk management; risk-oriented supervision.

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