The Impact of Risk and Monitoring on CEO Equity Incentives

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana M. Albuquerque ◽  
George Papadakis ◽  
Peter D. Wysocki
Keyword(s):  
Equity Incentives ◽  
The Impact

An Empirical Study of Equity Incentive on the Stock Valuation of Tobacco Companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 2392-2400
Author(s):  
Chen Huaitao ◽  
Deng Yanhong
Keyword(s):  
Positive Impact ◽  
Reference Value ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Stock Valuation ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Equity Incentive ◽  
A Share

Objectives: Since the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies, the equity incentives of A-share listed companies have become normalized, the discussion of the effect of the implementation of equity incentives on stock valuation can provide a reference for investors whether to choose listed companies with equity incentives for stock valuation. This paper uses python tool to select 30 A-share listed companies that formally started to implement equity incentives in 2018 and the proportion of equity incentives is between 4% and 6% as the sample, and uses cross-sectional data model for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that: first, the implementation of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies has a positive impact on stock valuation, and the impact of equity incentive on stock valuation is significantly better than that before implementation, and the incentive stocks have more investment value; Second, the conclusion is also suitable for Chinese tobacco related companies, which has important reference value for tobacco preference investors.

From venture capital towards venture firm innovation performance: evidence from SMEs of China

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Yanran Ma ◽  
Jianfeng Cai ◽  
Yiqi Wang ◽  
Umar Farooq Sahibzada
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Innovation Performance ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Firm Innovation ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Start Ups ◽  
The Impact

Based on information asymmetry, agency theory and resource-based view (RBV), this study investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) on venture firm innovation performance, ascertains the extent to which VC affects venture firm innovation performance and finds the mediating effect of management incentives. Constructing a sample of a novel panel dataset of firms listed on the SME Board of China, we examined a sample of 927 start-ups between 2008 and 2017, showing a notable negative relationship between VC and Patent, and a positive relationship between VC and total factor productivity (TFP), providing stable evidence that VC could not spur firm patent directly, but facilitate the commercialization of innovation. Moreover, it shows that management equity incentives (MEI) and management cash incentives (MCI) playing significant positive mediating role between VC and TFP, while there is no mediating effect between VC and Patent. Findings of this study strengthen the experience of VC and suggest how practitioners of SMEs to enhance the commercialization of innovation, considerably extends our understanding of the impact of VC on venture firm innovation performance.

scholarly journals The social context of compensation design: Social norms and the impact of equity incentives

2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (5) ◽  
pp. 1233-1250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon Zolotoy ◽  
Don O’Sullivan ◽  
Geoffrey P. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Compensation Design

The Impact of CEO and CFO Equity Incentives on Audit Scope and Perceived Risks as Revealed Through Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yezen H. Kannan ◽  
Terrance R. Skantz ◽  
Julia L. Higgs
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Share Price ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Planning ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY: In 2013, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) proposed an amendment to Auditing Standard No. 12 (PCAOB 2010) that would require auditors to consider executive compensation in audit planning because of potential fraud risk associated with equity incentives. We use the association between audit fees and CEO and CFO equity incentives to infer whether auditors increase audit scope and perceive greater risk as equity incentives increase. Equity incentives are defined as the sensitivity of the value of executives' equity portfolios to changes in share price (delta incentive) and to changes in return volatility (vega incentive). We find a positive association between audit fees and vega, but not delta. However, when we interact vega with proxies for residual auditor business risk, we find that the fee premiums for risk decrease as vega increases. Our results suggest that auditors do consider executive compensation in audit planning.

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