scholarly journals International Climate Agreements, Cost Reductions and Convergence of Partisan Politics

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Laurency ◽  
Dirk Schindler
Keyword(s):  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
Cost Reductions ◽  
International Climate

scholarly journals Efficient incomplete international climate agreements

1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Golombek ◽  
Catherine Hagem ◽  
Michael Hoel
Keyword(s):  
Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate

scholarly journals Better predictions, better allocations: scientific advances and adaptation to climate change

2015 ◽  
Vol 373 (2055) ◽  
pp. 20150122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Freeman ◽  
Ben Groom ◽  
Richard J. Zeckhauser
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Climate Science ◽  
Consumption Smoothing ◽  
Adaptation To Climate Change ◽  
Adaptation Measures ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Informative Signals

Climate science initially aspired to improve understanding of what the future would bring, and thereby produce appropriate public policies and effective international climate agreements. If that hope is dashed, as now seems probable, effective policies for adapting to climate change become critical. Climate science assumes new responsibilities by helping to foster more appropriate adaptation measures, which might include shifting modes or locales of production. This theoretical article focuses on two broader tools: consumption smoothing in response to the risk of future losses, and physical adaptation measures to reduce potential damages. It shows that informative signals on the effects of climate change facilitate better decisions on the use of each tool, thereby increasing social welfare.

scholarly journals Market responses to global governance: International climate cooperation and Europe's carbon trading

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Federica Genovese
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Environmental Cooperation ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

Abstract International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.

scholarly journals The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Weikard ◽  
Michael Finus ◽  
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Keyword(s):  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Surplus Sharing ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
International Climate ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Dynamic climate clubs: On the effectiveness of incentives in global climate agreements

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (45) ◽  
pp. e2109988118
Author(s):  
William Nordhaus
Keyword(s):  
Global Climate ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Potential Strength ◽  
Single Period ◽  
International Climate Policy ◽  
International Climate Agreements ◽  
Trade Sanctions ◽  
International Climate

A proposal to combat free riding in international climate agreements is the establishment of a climate club—a coalition of countries in a structure to encourage high levels of participation. Empirical models of climate clubs in the early stages relied on the analysis of single-period coalition formation. The earlier results suggested that there were limits to the potential strength of clubs and that it would be difficult to have deep abatement strategies in the club framework. The current study extends the single-period approach to many periods and develops an approach analyzing “supportable policies” to analyze multiperiod clubs. The major element of the present study is the interaction between club effectiveness and rapid technological change. Neither alone will produce incentive-compatible policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of international climate policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological decarbonization will be too costly to produce deep abatement; similarly, rapid technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep abatement because of country free riding. However, the two together can achieve international climate objectives.

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