The Effect of Contract Framing on Subordinates Performance and Propensity to Create Budgetary Slack

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maia Farkas ◽  
Lee Kersting ◽  
Uday S. Murthy
2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-153
Author(s):  
Ody Tegar Permana ◽  
Eliada Herwiyanti ◽  
I Wayan Mustika

This study aims to determine the effect of budgetary participation, information asymmetry, budget pressure, and organizational commitment to budgetary slack. Population in this research is all government institution in Banyumas Regency. The sample selection was conducted by census method. Dependent variable used in this research is budget slack, while the independent variable used in this research is budget participation, information asymmetry, budget pressure, and organizational commitment. The data has been collected through questionnaires, then processed with the help of SPSS software. Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis concluded that budgetary participation, information asymmetry, and organizational commitment affect the budget slack while budget pressure has no effect. The results of this study increasingly complement previous studies in the field of management accounting, especially in the scope of budgeting.   Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh partisipasi anggaran, asimetri informasi, tekanan anggaran, dan komitmen organisasi terhadap senjangan anggaran. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah seluruh instansi pemerintahan di Kabupaten Banyumas. Pemilihan sampel dilakukan dengan metode sensus. Variabel dependen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah senjangan anggaran, sedangkan variabel independen yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah partisipasi anggaran, asimetri informasi, tekanan anggaran, dan komitmen organisasi. Data yang telah dikumpulkan melalui isian kuesioner, selanjutnya diolah dengan bantuan software SPSS. Berdasarkan hasil analisis regresi linear berganda disimpulkan bahwa partisipasi anggaran, asimetri informasi, dan komitmen organisasi berpengaruh terhadap senjangan anggaran sedangkan tekanan anggaran tidak berpengaruh. Hasil penelitian ini semakin melengkapi penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya di bidang akuntansi manajemen khususnya di lingkup penganggaran.


Controlling ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 281-282
Author(s):  
Joachim Sautter
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E. Nichol

ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this study's theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can sometimes increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. Data Availability: Contact the author.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-159
Author(s):  
Lyn K.L. Tjon Soei Len

AbstractGlobal value chains (GVCs) resist dominant contract framing, because presumptions about contract’s bilateral structure and party autonomy fail to capture the complex interconnections between private exchange relations. Contract law seems to obscure, rather than capture, the ways in which the relationships and experiences of various actors in GVCs are linked. This article argues that, in doing so, contract law contributes to systemic hermeneutical injustice. Systemic hermeneutical injustice captures how shared interpretative resources can render those in disadvantaged positions of social power unable to make intelligible that what is in their interest to render intelligible. The article’s primary aim is to show how this form of injustice bears on contract law and how it can function as an independent normative constraint on the institution of contract law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernie Riswandari

<p><em>Budgetting carries behavioral problem that can have important effect on the effectiveness of organization. This study to examine the influency of participatory budgeting and job relevant information toward descent of asimetric information.</em><em>This research make use of deskriptif assosiatif method with utilized technic anlysis datas are  linier regresion, F-test and T - test.Result shows participatory budgetting and job relevant information simultanously have significant toward descent of asymetric information and so does partially.If asimetric information go down, its will to descent of budgetary slack.   </em></p><p><strong>Keywords :</strong> <em>Participatory Budgeting, Job Relevant Information, Asimetric Information,</em><em> Bundgetary Slack</em></p>


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanna Gallani ◽  
Ranjani Krishnan ◽  
Eric Jonathan Marinich ◽  
Michael D. Shields

Author(s):  
Eka Fitria Ambarini ◽  
Mispiyanti Mispiyanti

This study aimed to examine the causal relationship between budget emphasis, self-esteem and budget participation by using primary data collected by distributing questionnaires to the respondent. The population was the OPD Regency of Kebumen with a purposive sampling as a sampling technique. From 75 questionnaires that have been distributed, 70 questionnaires have been received and only 43 questionnaires that could be processed. This studied used multiple regression analysis methods. The study showed that based on the t-test:  budget emphasis and self-esteem have a positive and significant effect on budgetary slack, while budget participation does not affect budgetary slack. The coefficient of determination (R²) showed 29,5%, that was mean 29,5% variable of budgetary slack influenced by variables budget emphasis, self-esteem, and budget participation but 70,5% explained by other variables which not exist in this research


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-96
Author(s):  
Nayang Helmayunita ◽  
Ade Elsa Betavia

This study aims to examine the effect of compensation schemes, self efficacy and moral reasoning on slack budgeting. In this study the hypothesis is proposed that in the slack inducing compensation scheme the slack budgeting will be greater than using the truth inducing compensation scheme, then managers with low self efficacy will do slack budgeting compared to those with high self efficacy. It is also proposed that the individual with low moral reasoning will do slack budgeting rather than the individual with high moral reasoning. The research design in this study was a quasi 2 x 2 laboratory experiment, with Accounting students who had sat in the 5th semester of Padang State University as lower level managers who participated in budgeting. The statistical method used to test the hypothesis is two-way ANOVA. This study provides results that the compensation scheme can affect slack budgeting actions, self efficacy has no effect on slack budgeting actions, and the interaction between slack inducing compensation schemes with low self efficacy has no effect on slack budgeting actions. Moral reasoning affects slack budgeting actions, and at lower level managers who have low levels of moral reasoning and low levels of self efficacy, interactions with slack inducing compensation schemes affect slack budgeting actions. The results of this study can contribute in the management accounting literature related to budgetary slack and its causal factors. Keyword: Slack Budgeting, Compensation Schemes, Self Efficacy, and Moral Reasoning.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
Risma Wira Bharata ◽  
Eko Suwardi ◽  
Mimin Nur Aisyah

Abstract: This study explores the effect of budgetary participation on budgetary slack with organizational culture as an intervening variable in inclusive schools. This study used a survey method by distributing questionnaires consisting of six questions for budgetary slack, five questions budget participation, and 23 questions organizational culture. Used purposive sampling, the study included 100 inclusive school principals and ten education office staff who handled the inclusive school budget. Data were analyzed through a path analysis by using PLS. This study shows that budgetary participation affects organizational culture but has no effect on budgetary slack. Moreover, organizational culture does not mediate the relationship between budget participation and budgetary slack. The Office of Education and Inclusive Schools are suggested to establish better communication and strengthen an organizational culture that can encourage inclusive schools to participate in budgeting to reduce budgetary slack in inclusive education.Keywords: Budget Participation, Budgetary Slack, Organizational CultureHubungan Keagenan dalam Penganggaran pada Sekolah Inklusi di Kabupaten GunungkidulAbstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menyelidiki pengaruh partisipasi anggaran terhadap senjangan anggaran dengan budaya organisasi sebagai variabel intervening pada sekolah inklusif. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode survei dengan menyebarkan kuesioner yang terdiri dari 6 pertanyaan untuk senjangan anggaran, 5 pertanyaan partisipasi anggaran, dan 23 pertanyaan budaya organisasi. Sampel menggunakan purposive sampling, yang meliputi 100 kepala sekolah inklusif dan 10 pegawai dinas pendidikan yang menangani anggaran sekolah inklusif. Analisis data menggunakan analisis jalur dengan PLS. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa partisipasi anggaran berpengaruh terhadap budaya organisasi namun tidak dapat menemukan pengaruh partisipasi anggaran terhadap senjangan anggaran. Penelitian ini tidak membuktikan bahwa budaya organisasi dapat memediasi hubungan antara partisipasi anggaran dan senjangan anggaran. Dinas pendidikan dan sekolah inklusif diharapkan dapat menjalin komunikasi yang lebih baik dan memperkuat budaya organisasi yang dapat mendorong sekolah inklusif untuk berpartisipasi dalam penyusunan anggaran sehingga mengurangi senjangan anggaran dalam pendidikan inklusif.Kata kunci: Partisipasi Anggaran, Senjangan Anggaran, Budaya Organisasi


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