scholarly journals Private Equity Takeovers and Employment in the UK: Some Empirical Evidence

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Goergen ◽  
Noel O'Sullivan ◽  
Geoffrey Wood
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
The Uk

scholarly journals Private Equity Takeovers and Employment in the UK: Some Empirical Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Goergen ◽  
Noel O'Sullivan ◽  
Geoff Wood
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
The Uk

Narrative Exchange as Knowledge Transfer: The Rhetorical Construction of Opposition to GM Crops in SW England

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Downing
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Transfer ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Food Chain ◽  
Genetically Modified Organisms ◽  
Local Food ◽  
Culturally Appropriate ◽  
Rhetorical Construction ◽  
Risks And Benefits ◽  
Ethnographic Data ◽  
The Uk

The release of genetically modified organisms into the environment and food chain in the UK has produced one of the most visible and enduring controversies of recent times. Amid ongoing claim and counter-claim by actors on either side of the GM ‘debate’ over the salient ‘facts’ or balance of risks and benefits associated with the technology, this controversy can be fruitfully seen as a struggle between contested networks of knowledge. Drawing on ethnographic data collected during recent PhD fieldwork, I focus on those, loosely defined as members of ‘local food networks’ in SW England, who perceive their values and cultural projects to be at risk from the deployment of this technology. In scrutinizing how distinctly ‘oppositional’ knowledge is created, exchanged and transformed particularly in relation to the construction and maintenance of cultural and historical boundaries, I suggest that in this arena a key vehicle of knowledge transfer is the narrative or story. A successfully deployed narrative can resolve uncertainties, or equally, dissolve undesirable certainties. Knowledge transfer thus becomes a matter of rhetoric, of persuasion, whereby skilfully deployed narratives can be viewed as analogical networks of associations - enrolling culturally appropriate characters, values and concepts - to move the targeted audience in the desired manner. I argue that such transfers must be seen not only as exchanges of networks of knowledge but also of networks of ignorance, for as the ethnographic data reveals, when the stakes are perceived to be so high, ideological coherence often outweighs empirical evidence and logical consistency. This raises a critical dilemma for the ethnographer. What should he/she do when confronted in the field by exaggerated claims or misinformation?

The Market for Corporate Control: Value, Stakeholders, and Governance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kershaw
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Short Term ◽  
The Public ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation ◽  
Control Value ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Empirical Context ◽  
The Uk

This Chapter introduces the market for corporate control and provides theoretical and empirical context about the functioning and effects of the market for corporate control. Ideally such context should inform the analysis and evaluation of the Takeover Code’s regulation of the UK market for corporate control. However, as the Chapter shows, neither our understanding of the likely effects of the market for corporate control on companies, boards, shareholders and stakeholders, nor the state of empirical evidence provide clear cut guidance on how to regulate the market for corporate control. The Chapter considers evidence on the value effects of takeovers and shows that evidence from the short term market response to announced takeovers supports claims that takeovers in aggregate generate value, but the longer term evidence is more mixed and inconclusive. It also considers the methodological limitations of both the short term and long term evidence. The Chapter then proceeds to consider the effect of the market for corporate control on stakeholders. It explores the commonly held view that takeovers are detrimental for employees but finds again that the empirical evidence is inconclusive, although the theoretical case that takeover activity may undermine employee investment in the business remains compelling. The Chapter then explores the role of the market for corporate control as a governance device. It is often assumed that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary device holding managers to account, but as the Chapter shows the disciplinary effects work differently and less precisely than regulators and the public debate commonly assume. The Chapter also shows that such indirect effects may also mould management and board behaviour in economically suboptimal ways, which the Chapter considers in the context of the debate about the possible short term orientation of UK boards.

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