scholarly journals Employment Protection Reform, Enforcement in Collective Agreements and Worker Flows

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredrik Heyman ◽  
Per Skedinger
Keyword(s):  
Employment Protection ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Worker Flows

Job and Worker Flows

2015 ◽  
pp. 62-76
Author(s):  
N. Vishnevskaya
Keyword(s):  
Labor Force ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Important Place ◽  
Worker Flows ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Cross Country

Current economic literature demonstrates an increasing interest to the process of job’s creation and destruction as well to labor force turnover. The article summarizes the results of recent foreign theoretical and empirical research on various aspects of labor mobility. Particular attention is paid to the research analyzing differences in dynamics of labor and job reallocations in developed and transitional economies. The cross-country comparative analysis provide a basis for several important conclusions. Firstly, despite significant cross-country differences the dynamics of job reallocation in economies under transition exceeds on the whole those in developed countries. Secondly, the structure of the economy (manufacturing sector versus services) is one of the main factors determining both job and worker flows. Thirdly, there is an opposite relationship between the dynamics of job turnover and the size of enterprise. Small firms play a very important role in job creation, while large firms dominate in absolute numbers of jobs created. Fourthly, among the factors determining the differences in job and labor force dynamics institutional characteristics occupy an important place. This suggests that country-specific policies and institutions are likely to play an important role in determining the level of job and worker reallocation. Stringent employment protection for regular contracts is believed to have a statistically significant negative effect on the workers’ reallocation. Unemployment benefits’ generosity appears to have a positive impact on average gross worker flows. By contrast, statutory minimum wages do not seem to have any sizeable effect on gross worker flows.

Relaxation of employment protection and labour reallocation

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 898-926 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liina Malk
Keyword(s):  
Labour Force ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Job Transitions ◽  
Worker Flows ◽  
Protection Legislation ◽  
One Year

Purpose – Employment law reform enforced in Estonia in mid-2009 provides a good opportunity to examine the outcomes of employment protection legislation (EPL). The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of the reduction in EPL on labour reallocation. Design/methodology/approach – The author exploits the micro-data of the Labour Force Survey to estimate the probabilities of one-year worker flows with probit models, and uses a difference in differences (DID) approach to identify the effects of the EPL reform. Findings – The author finds that the reduction in EPL seems to have increased the probability of transitions out of employment. At the same time, she does not find any significant effect of this reform on the probability of flows into employment. The evaluation also gives evidence of a lowered probability of job-to-job transitions resulting from the reduction in EPL. Research limitations/implications – In this paper, the DID estimation is conducted by using Lithuanians as the control group for Estonians. However, it should be noted that this approach assumes strong similarities between these countries in order to obtain reliable estimates. Originality/value – The findings of this paper raise the possibility that the reduction in EPL alone may not have been sufficient for achieving a better reallocation of labour and this is important to consider in the context of further developments in other labour market institutions.

Managers on balancing employment protection and what’s good for the company: Intended and unintended consequences of a semi-coercive institution

2021 ◽  
pp. 0143831X2199353
Author(s):  
Charlotta Stern ◽  
Linda Weidenstedt
Keyword(s):  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Employment Protection Legislation ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Institutional Legitimacy ◽  
Collective Agreements ◽  
Intended Behavior ◽  
Protection Legislation ◽  
The Law

Sweden’s institutionalized employment protection legislation, ‘LAS’, is interesting theoretically because parts of it are semi-coercive. The semi-coerciveness makes it possible for firms and unions under collective agreements to negotiate departures from the law. Thus, the law is more flexible than the legal text suggests. The present study explores intended and unintended consequences of LAS as experienced by managers of smaller manufacturing companies. The results suggest that managers support the idea of employment protection in principle but face a difficult balancing act in dealing with LAS. From their point of view, the legislation’s institutional legitimacy is low, producing local cultures of hypocrisy and pretense. The article gives insights into how institutions aimed at specific, intended behavior sometimes end up producing unintended consequences fostering the opposite.

scholarly journals The China Shock, Employment Protection, and European Jobs

ILR Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 001979392110522
Author(s):  
Hedieh Aghelmaleki ◽  
Ronald Bachmann ◽  
Joel Stiebale
Keyword(s):  
Job Loss ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Import Competition ◽  
Worker Flows ◽  
Level Data

The authors investigate the effects of Chinese import competition on transitions into and out of employment using comparable worker-level data for 14 European countries. Results indicate that, on average, Chinese imports are associated with an increased probability that employed workers become unemployed and with a reduction in worker flows from unemployment to employment. In countries with high levels of employment protection, incumbent workers are shielded against the risk of job loss due to Chinese competition, but unemployed workers’ prospects seem to be particularly negatively affected in these countries. The authors also provide evidence that the effects of increased Chinese imports differ by worker groups and the tasks performed on the job.

What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Blanchard ◽  
Pedro Portugal
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Labor Markets ◽  
Job Creation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Unemployment Duration ◽  
Unemployment Rates ◽  
Worker Flows ◽  
High Employment ◽  
Job Creation And Destruction

Behind similar unemployment rates in the United States and Portugal hide two very different labor markets. Unemployment duration is three times longer in Portugal than in the United States. Symmetrically, flows of workers into unemployment are three times lower in Portugal. These lower flows come in roughly equal proportions from lower job creation and destruction, and from lower worker flows given job creation and destruction. A plausible explanation is high employment protection in Portugal. High employment protection makes economies more sclerotic; but because it affects unemployment duration and worker flows in opposite directions, the effect on unemployment is ambiguous. (JEL E2, J3, J6)

The Effects of Employment Protection legislationon Personnel Policies: A Review of Theoretical Modelsand Empirical results

2014 ◽  
pp. 126-140
Author(s):  
O. Mironenko
Keyword(s):  
Personnel Selection ◽  
Selection Criteria ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Employment Protection ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Protection Legislation ◽  
Labour Contracts ◽  
Hiring And Firing ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Personnel Policies

Employers incur costs while fulfilling the requirements of employment protection legislation. The article contains a review of the core theoretical models and empirical results concerning the impact of these costs on firms’ practices in hiring, firing, training and remuneration. Overall, if wages are flexible or enforcement is weak, employment protection does not significantly influence employers’ behavior. Otherwise, stringent employment protection results in the reduction of hiring and firing rates, changes in personnel selection criteria, types of labour contracts and dismissal procedures, and, in some cases, it may lead to the growth of wages and firms’ investments to human capital.

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