scholarly journals The Communication Complexity of Private Value Single Item Auctions

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Elena Grigorieva ◽  
Rudolf Muller ◽  
Dries Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
Communication Complexity ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Single Item Auctions ◽  
Private Value

scholarly journals The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 491-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Grigorieva ◽  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Rudolf Müller ◽  
Dries Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
Communication Complexity ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Single Item Auctions ◽  
Private Value

scholarly journals The private value single item bisection auction

2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Grigorieva ◽  
P. Jean-Jacques. Herings ◽  
Rudolf Müller ◽  
Dries Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
Single Item ◽  
Private Value

scholarly journals Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Chen ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Yingkai Li
Keyword(s):  
Production Cost ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Valuation Function ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Private Value ◽  
Cost Monotonicity ◽  
Strategy Incentive ◽  
Two Sided Markets

We study how to maximize the broker's (expected) profit in a two-sided market, where she buys items from a set of sellers and resells them to a set of buyers. Each seller has a single item to sell and holds a private value on her item, and each buyer has a valuation function over the bundles of the sellers' items. We consider the Bayesian setting where the agents' values/valuations are independently drawn from prior distributions, and aim at designing dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) mechanisms that are approximately optimal. Production-cost markets, where each item has a publicly-known cost to be produced, provide a platform for us to study two-sided markets. Briefly, we show how to covert a mechanism for production-cost markets into a mechanism for the broker, whenever the former satisfies cost-monotonicity. This reduction holds even when buyers have general combinatorial valuation functions. When the buyers' valuations are additive, we generalize an existing mechanism to production-cost markets in an approximation-preserving way. We then show that the resulting mechanism is cost-monotone and thus can be converted into an 8-approximation mechanism for two-sided markets.

scholarly journals The Private Value Single Item Bisection Auction

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Elena Grigorieva ◽  
Rudolf Muller ◽  
Dries Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
Single Item ◽  
Private Value
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