Centros: vrijheid van vestiging zonder race to the bottom

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans De Wulf
Keyword(s):  
Race To The Bottom

Implicit Taxes Amid Race to the Bottom in a Global Tax Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn
Keyword(s):  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Tax Returns ◽  
Tax Hypothesis

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation

A Race to the Bottom: Strong States and the Delusion of Proxy Warfare

Asia Policy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-184
Author(s):  
Tamanna Salikuddin
Keyword(s):  
Race To The Bottom

Corporate (Non-)Accountability and Human Rights

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 503-523
Author(s):  
Stéfanie Khoury
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Washington Consensus ◽  
Corporate Accountability ◽  
Criminal Courts ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Binding Mechanisms

Abstract The role of business in violations of human rights has been at the heart of international debates for decades. As early as the 1970s attempts were made at the UN by Global South nations (known as the G-77) to establish internationally-binding mechanisms to address corporate violations of human rights. Ultimately, those attempts were watered down into “codes of conduct”. In the early 1990s, the “Washington Consensus” was used to steer states to deregulate and restructure their economies in a race-to-the-bottom that placed emphasis upon integrating the global economy over human rights and environmental protections. Although corporate violations existed before, it was only at this juncture that many human rights cases were brought into public view. Some litigation was pursued, but it was most often in tort, and sometimes in criminal courts. This article argues that the existing regional human rights courts have bolstered corporate human rights, while at the same time have remained on the sidelines of addressing corporate accountability. The emergent ASEAN human rights system has not yet developed a human rights court. The article suggests that there are key grassroots movements shaping human rights discourses around corporate accountability through the region and that these offer exciting prospects for an alternative approach to addressing corporate accountability through a prospective supervisory mechanism.

Comparative Environmental Federalism: Subsidiarity and Central Regulation in the United States and China

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiyu Zhao ◽  
Robert Percival
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
National Governments ◽  
National Environmental

AbstractThe proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document