Interlocking Directorships and Cross-Shareholdings Among the Italian Blue Chips

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Drago ◽  
Stefano Manestra ◽  
Paolo Santella
2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Drago ◽  
Stefano Manestra ◽  
Paolo Santella

Area ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Brayshay ◽  
Mark Cleary ◽  
John Selwood

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitsuaki Okabe

Corporations may be said to be engines of any market economy and their proper behavior is a key to economic, hence human, security. This paper argues that one of the most important causes for the prolonged period of recessions of the Japanese economy in the 1990’s is deeply rooted in the long-established financial structure of the economy and in the closely related issue of corporate governance. Although Japanese corporations have been traditionally understood that their activities are monitored and governed by “main banks,” this framework has been changing over the last 10-15 years toward corporate governance driven by pressure from capital markets. This change has been necessitated by: (a) less need on the part of corporations to rely on banks in acquiring funds, (b) ongoing dissolution of cross shareholdings, (3) an increasing importance for the role of institutional investors, and (4) innovations in information and communication technologies. The change may be regarded as being one from “process innovation” toward a system conducive to “product innovation;” hence a desirable shift. There remain, however, a number of policy tasks, such as institutional improvement in securities investment trusts and the need to better define the role of institutional investors


1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hughes ◽  
John Scott ◽  
John Mackenzie

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Sacristán-Navarro ◽  
Silvia Gómez-Ansón

This aim of this article is to describe, in the Spanish setting, family ownership and to explore how families hold their shares (the use of indirect ownership, pyramids, and cross-shareholdings). It also seeks to describe to what extent cash-flow rights differ from control rights and the degree of the firm's professionalization according to every type of owner category, but especially for families.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-259
Author(s):  
Shinya Kawamoto ◽  
Takashi Saito

This study has examined cases of management buyouts (MBOs), which have been increasing rapidly in number since around 2000. First, an overview of MBO practices is provided, indicating the beginning of an increase in divestment-type MBOs as a new means to implement corporate restructuring. Subsequently, the factors used by Japanese companies to decide on whether to pursue divestment MBO were analyzed while particularly addressing the parent companies––the sellers of the business units. Results suggest the following factors leading to the parent company divestment of subsidiaries and business units through MBOs: 1) poor performance of the business of the parent company, 2) high debt-to-asset ratio (debt reliance) of the parent company, 3) wide diversification of parent company operations, and 4) active reorganization of the parent company’s corporate group. The structure of corporate governance also affects MBO trends, indicating that 5) companies for which shareholding ratios of institutional investors and directors are high are more likely to implement a divestment MBO. Conversely, 6) companies that are protected by cross-shareholdings are less likely to implement corporate restructuring.


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