scholarly journals Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viral V. Acharya ◽  
Denis Gromb ◽  
Tanju Yorulmazer
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Interbank Market

scholarly journals Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viral V Acharya ◽  
Denis Gromb ◽  
Tanju Yorulmazer
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Interbank Market ◽  
Asset Sales ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Interbank Lending ◽  
Liquidity Frictions

We study interbank lending and asset sales markets in which banks with surplus liquidity have market power vis-à-vis banks needing liquidity, frictions arise in lending due to moral hazard, and assets are bank-specific. Surplus banks ration lending and instead purchase assets from needy banks, an inefficiency more acute during financial crises. A central bank acting as a lender-of-last-resort can ameliorate this inefficiency provided it is prepared to extend potentially loss-making loans or is better informed than outside markets, as might be the case if it also performs a supervisory role. This rationale for central banking finds support in historical episodes. (JEL E58, G01, G21, G28, L13, N21)

LIQUIDITY, INTERBANK MARKET, AND THE SUPERVISORY ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Young Sik Kim
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Interbank Market ◽  
Monitoring Cost ◽  
Delegated Monitoring ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Cash Reserves

This paper provides an explanation for the supervisory role of the central bank in a monetary general equilibrium model of bank liquidity provision. Under incomplete information on the individual banks' liquidity needs, individual banks find it optimal to invest solely in bank loans holding no cash reserves, and rely on the interbank market for their withdrawal demands. Using the costly state verification approach under uncertainty in aggregate liquidity demands, the supervisory role of the central bank as a large intermediary arises as an incentive-compatible arrangement by which banks hold the correct level of cash reserves. First, it takes up a delegated monitoring role for the banking system. Second, it engages in discount-window lending at a penalty rate, where the discount margin covers exactly the monitoring cost incurred. Finally, under the central banking mechanism, currency premium no longer exists in the sense that currency is worth the same as deposits having an equal face value.

Phase Model of Market Economy

2005 ◽  
pp. 41-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Yegorenkov ◽  
E. Kazakova ◽  
M. Starodubtseva
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Consumer Goods ◽  
Imperfect Competition ◽  
Phase Model ◽  
Status Change ◽  
Means Of Production

The phase model of market economy is suggested in the article. It is formalized in the cubical equation The equation takes into account the imperfections of competition and the fact that consumer goods are produced with the help of means of production. Transitions from the imperfect competition to the perfect one and visa versa yield qualitative status change of market economy.

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