The Role of Bargaining Power in Relational Contracts

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Cordero Salas
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Relational Contracts

scholarly journals Inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners: the role of collective bargaining and trade unions

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-46
Author(s):  
Maarten Keune
Keyword(s):  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Wage Inequality ◽  
Trade Unions ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Union Density ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Union Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Earners ◽  
The Relationship

In the context of rising inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners in Europe, this state-of-the-art article reviews the literature concerning the relationship between collective bargaining and inequality. It focuses on two main questions: (i) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and inequality between capital and labour? and (ii) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and wage inequality among wage-earners? Both questions are discussed in general terms and for single- and multi-employer bargaining systems. It is argued that collective bargaining coverage and union density are negatively related to both types of inequality. These relationships are however qualified by four additional factors: who unions represent, the weight of union objectives other than wages, the statutory minimum wage, and extensions of collective agreements by governments.

Initiating Negotiations: The Role of Machiavellianism, Risk Propensity, and Bargaining Power

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1081-1101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilias Kapoutsis ◽  
Roger J. Volkema ◽  
Andreas G. Nikolopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Risk Propensity

scholarly journals The role of sales effort on manufacturer's channel strategies

2018 ◽  
Vol 189 ◽  
pp. 06003
Author(s):  
Baixun Li ◽  
Guo Chen ◽  
Yaru Nan
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Power Coefficient ◽  
Channel Design ◽  
Competition Intensity

Competing manufacturers, who sell their products through retailers, may face the strategic distribution channel design question of whether to establish an “store-within-store” channel or not. With consider of the role of sales effort, we analyze the manufacturer channel strategies. Two cases are considered: competing manufacturer and competing retailer. We built four game models corresponding to four channel strategies, and discussed the influence of manufacture's bargaining power coefficient, prices competition intensity, and sales effort competition intensity on manufactures' channel strategies.

A model of electoral alliances in highly fragmented party systems

2020 ◽  
pp. 095162982096318
Author(s):  
Marcelo de C Griebeler ◽  
Roberta Carnelos Resende
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Alliance Formation ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
The World ◽  
Political Groups

Highly fragmented party systems are composed of a large number of political groups, many of which have negligible bargaining power when it comes to negotiations of electoral alliances. Inspired by the Brazilian system—one of the most fragmented in the world—we provide a stylized model of electoral alliances in which there is a competition for the support of the small parties. Two leading parties try to entice a small one by simultaneously offering transfers (e.g. government positions, support in other elections, prestige). Through a first-price sealed-bid auction approach, we can analyze the role of two particular factors in alliance formation, namely pragmatism and ideology. Our findings show that, in equilibrium, the favorite party tends to offer lower transfers than the underdog. Furthermore, the closer the leading and the small parties are in terms of ideology, the smaller the transferred amount. When the ideological closeness between the small party and the underdog is sufficiently large—relative to the favorite—the effect may be strong enough to overcome the electoral advantage of the favorite.

scholarly journals The Strategic Role of Nonbinding Communication

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis A. Palacio ◽  
Alexandra Cortés-Aguilar ◽  
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Strategic Role ◽  
Different Levels

This paper studies the conditions that improve bargaining power using threats and promises. We develop a model of strategic communication, based on theconflict game with perfect information, in which a noisycommitment messageis sent by a better-informed sender to a receiver who takes an action that determines the welfare of both. Our model captures different levels of aligned-preferences, for which classical games such asstag hunt,hawk-dove, andprisoner’s dilemmaare particular cases. We characterise the Bayesian perfect equilibrium with nonbinding messages undertruth-telling beliefsandsender’s bargaining powerassumptions. Through our equilibrium selection we show that the less conflict the game has, the more informative the equilibrium signal is and less credibility is necessary to implement it.

scholarly journals Contention and Compromise: a Comparative Analysis of Budgetary Politics

1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Cusack
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Behavioral Theory ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Budgetary Process ◽  
Extended Version ◽  
Level Model ◽  
Budgetary Politics ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Reconciliation Process

ABSTRACTThis paper attempts to place the role of defense spending within the overall context of the budgetary process. Using an extended version of the ‘Competing Aspirations Level Model’ based on the behavioral theory of decision-making, major budgetary aggregates, total spending, defense spending, exhaustive civilian expenditures, and capital outlays, are modelled as outcomes of independently generated aspirations, based on parochial organizational and environmental influences, and a reconciliation process reflecting the bargaining power of budgetary agents. An empirical assessment of the model's performance is conducted using the experience of thirteen national governments, including seven western industrialized states and six developing states. The results of this statistical analysis suggest that the model provides a useful basis for understanding and comparing budgetary processes and outcomes.

Talking Back: The Role of Narrative in Vietnam’s Recent Land Compensation Changes

Urban Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette M. Kim
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Land Development ◽  
Organisational Structure ◽  
Social Narratives ◽  
The Social ◽  
Compensation Packages

As in other rapidly growing economies, Vietnam’s urban land development has been a source of social conflict as those who are relocated contest the distribution of economic gains. More recently, the relocated have increased their bargaining power and receive better compensation packages. The paper analyses this situation to discuss further developing our understanding of how property rights institutions change. The case study shows the efficacy of social narratives to renegotiate the terms of the social contract supporting property rights even in a society with limited means for public participation in governmental reform. Secondly, it illuminates that modern property rights are entwined with public finance and so property rights reforms are tied to the organisational structure of government and fiscal relations.

scholarly journals Economic Sovereignty as the Democratization of Work: The Role of Basic Income

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Casassas
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
Labour Force ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Economic Democracy ◽  
Wage Earning ◽  
The Right ◽  
Practice Projects

AbstractLet us understand economic democracy as the fourfold capacity (i) to decide what social relations we wish to “enter” in order to work; (ii) to determine the (im)material nature of the space where we decide to stay and work, which requires the capacity of having a “voice” that is effectively listened to; (iii) to opt for “exiting” this space in case its nature and functioning go against what we wish for our lives; and (iv) in case we opt for leaving, to resort to an outside-the-previous-workplace offering tools for second and subsequent opportunities, that is, to effectively “restart” our (re)productive lives in other terms and conditions. Basic income can play a crucial role in fostering such capacity. Because of its unconditionality, and thanks to bargaining power deriving from it, basic income is a sort of income that is convertible in terms of (a) time to conceive of (and put into practice) projects of one’s own, be it individually and/or collectively; (b) a capacity to explore alternative options and take promising risks; and (c) the right to credit, in the twofold sense of the right to financial resources and the right to social trust. As noticed and appreciated by some post-crash social movements, there are some spheres where such democracy-enhancing bargaining power may unfold: wage-earning work, the decommodification of labour force and the possible subsequent constitution of cooperatives and other self-managed (re)productive spaces, the household, entrepreneurship, socio-political participation, etc. In sum, more flexible combinations of different kinds of work may emerge when individuals and groups enjoy an income stream that is guaranteed as a right, which echoes both classical and contemporary discourses on the need for humans to have the democratic right to autonomously choose and determine work(s) all along the life cycle.

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