scholarly journals Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Valsecchi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Statistical Bias ◽  
Cheap Talk Games

scholarly journals Homophily, heterophily and the diversity of messages among decision-making individuals

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 180027 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pouria Ramazi ◽  
James Riehl ◽  
Ming Cao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Convergence Result ◽  
Term Survival ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
The Face ◽  
Cheap Talk Games ◽  
The One

To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals, we study the simple yet appealing use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games, when players are able to choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they do. So when playing games, in addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this setting: homophilic (respectively, heterophilic) cooperation which is to cooperate (respectively, defect) only with those who send the same message as they do. We reveal the intrinsic qualities of individuals playing the two strategies and show that under the replicator dynamics, homophilic cooperators engage in a battle of messages and will become dominated by whichever message is the most prevalent at the start, while populations of heterophilic cooperators exhibit a more harmonious behaviour, converging to a state of maximal diversity. Then we take Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) as the base of the cheap-talk game and show that the hostility of heterophilics to individuals with similar messages leaves no possibility for pure cooperators to survive in a population of the two, whereas the one-message dominance of homophilics allows for pure cooperators with the same tag as the dominant homophilics to coexist in the population, demonstrating that homophilics are more cooperative than heterophilics. Finally, we generalize an existing convergence result on population shares associated with weakly dominated strategies to a broadly applicable theorem and complete previous research on PD games with preplay communication by proving that the frequencies of all types of cooperators, i.e. pure, homophilic and heterophilic, converge to zero in the face of defectors. This implies homophily and heterophily cannot facilitate the long-term survival of cooperation in this setting, which urges studying cheap-talk games under other reproduction dynamics.

scholarly journals Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 14-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian de Groot Ruiz ◽  
Theo Offerman ◽  
Sander Onderstal
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Cheap Talk Games

scholarly journals Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games

1993 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell
Keyword(s):  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Cheap Talk Games

Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Blume ◽  
Joel Sobel
Keyword(s):  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Cheap Talk Games

scholarly journals MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 145-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRÉDÉRIC KOESSLER ◽  
FRANÇOISE FORGES
Keyword(s):  
Information Transmission ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Strategic Information Transmission ◽  
Bounded Number

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision maker. We state characterization results for the sets of equilibrium payoffs, with and without verifiable types. We then show that multistage, bilateral communication enables the players to achieve new equilibrium outcomes, even if types are verifiable. We also propose complete characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs that are achievable with a bounded number of communication rounds.

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