The Effect of Regulatory Oversight on the Association between Internal Governance Mechanisms and Audit Fees

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norziaton Ismail ◽  
Susela Devi ◽  
Chan Wai Meng
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Regulatory Oversight ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Internal Governance Mechanisms

The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration – Malaysian evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adel AlQadasi ◽  
Shamharir Abidin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Internal Governance Mechanisms

Purpose This study is motivated by the competing views on whether internal governance mechanisms complement or substitute for external auditing, and how this association is affected by ownership concentration. The complementary view predicts that good internal governance mechanisms are related to high-quality audit. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanisms may be substituted for each other, so more investment in governance mechanisms leads to less investment in external auditing. Therefore, this study aims to examine the association between internal governance mechanisms and the demand for audit quality. Design/methodology/approach Data from Malaysian listed companies during the period 2009 to 2012 are used. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is applied to analyse the data. Findings Companies with a higher concentration of ownership are less likely to demand extensive auditing. In addition, the study provides supporting evidence for the complementary association between a company’s governance and audit fees. However, the ownership concentration plays a minor role in the positive association between internal corporate governance and audit quality. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings. Practical implications Significant implications are provided for the audit profession in emerging economies, where concentrated ownership is common, to help policymakers and regulators in determining the power of controlling shareholders on audit quality and firm’s governance. The study’s findings open up avenues for further research. Originality/value This is the first work to address the role of ownership concentration in the association between corporate governance and audit quality; it suggests that the ownership structure must be considered in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance. The study also provides a comprehensive combination of internal governance mechanisms.

An investigation of the relation between ownership structure and management control in professional service organisations

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robyn King ◽  
Peter Clarkson
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Professional Services ◽  
Management Control ◽  
Professional Service ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
High Performing ◽  
Internal Governance Mechanisms

PurposeThis study aims to examine the interplay between ownership structure (organisational form) and management control system (MCS) design as governance structures within Australian primary health-care organisations (PHOs), seeking support for the suggestion that professional services will be most efficiently and effectively provided in organisations that have internal governance that is matched to their ownership form.Design/methodology/approachThe analysis is based on a series of in-depth investigations into the MCS choices made by seven Australian PHOs. Arguing that the degree of information impactedness is inversely related to the level of general practitioner (GP) ownership, organisations where more than 50 per cent of the GPs working within the practice are owners are classified as “high ownership” (“low information impactedness”). The adoption by high-performing organisations of their predicted MCS archetype according to Speklé’s development is then interpreted as representing empirical support.FindingsThe findings provide uniform support for the importance of the match between ownership structure and internal governance mechanisms. As predicted, the two high-performing, high member-owned organisations reported MCS resembling exploratory archetypes, the three high-performing, low member-owned organisations reported MCS consistent with a boundary archetype and the two low-performing organisations reported little emphasis on any control.Research limitations/implicationsThis study provides evidence of the importance of the appropriate match between ownership structure and internal governance mechanisms for PHOs.Practical implicationsThis study has potential to assist managers, owners and advisors to optimise MCS design in professional services organisations where there is heterogeneous ownership by professionals.Originality/valueThis study is one of the few attempts to provide empirical support for the assertion of the importance of a match between ownership structure and MCS design. It also represents one of the few attempts to provide empirical support for Speklé’s (2001) control archetypes, here the boundary and exploratory archetypes, archetypes that are applicable within important sectors of the economy, notably the professional services sector.

scholarly journals The mechanisms of governance in nonprofit organizations

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-88
Author(s):  
Cláudio Machado Filho ◽  
Adalberto Fischmann ◽  
Luciana Rocha de Mendonça ◽  
Sandra Guerra
Keyword(s):  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Internal Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Performance Comparisons ◽  
For Profit Organizations

This paper discusses the governance issues in nonprofit organizations (NPO). The theoretical framework of agency theory is used to analyze the relationship between agents and principals (donors and volunteers) in such kinds of organizations. Similarly to the for-profit organizations, the mechanisms of incentives and monitoring are crucial to the alignment of interests among principals and agents. However, considering the NPO’s intrinsic characteristics, due to the difficulty to implement external and internal governance mechanisms, the challenges of alignment are far more complicated. The NPOs are idiosyncratic, being in many situations complex to establish performance comparisons with similar organizations

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