scholarly journals Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism

Author(s):  
Stephen J. Choi ◽  
G. Mitu Gulati ◽  
Eric A. Posner
2015 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Galpin

The European Union has been in its biggest ever crisis since the onset of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Beyond the political and economic dimensions, the crisis has also sparked discussions about Germany's European identity. Some scholars have argued that Germany's behavior in the crisis signals a continuation of the process of “normalization” of its European identity toward a stronger articulation of national identity and interests, that it has “fallen out of love” with Europe. This article will seek to reassess these claims, drawing on detailed analysis of political and media discourse in Germany—from political speeches through to both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. It will argue that the crisis is understood broadly as a European crisis in Germany, where the original values of European integration are at stake. Furthermore, the crisis is debated through the lens of European solidarity, albeit with a particular German flavor of solidarity that draws on the economic tradition of ordoliberalism. Rather than strengthening expressions of national identity, this has resulted in the emergence of a new northern European identity in contrast to Greece or “southern Europe.”


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 204-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodoros Papadopoulos ◽  
Antonios Roumpakis

Familistic welfare capitalism is a model of national political economy prevalent in many regions in the world (Southern Europe, Latin America, and Asia), where the family plays a double role as the key provider of welfare and a key agent in the model's socio-economic and political reproduction. The article offers a new approach to the study this model by adopting an expanded concept of social reproduction to capture its historical evolution, using Greece as a case study. Our empirical analysis of austerity measures on employment and pensions demonstrates, how, in the Greek case, a crisis of social reproduction of the traditional form of familistic welfare capitalism was already underway prior to the well-known sovereign-debt crisis. And further we show how the adoption of austerity measures and pro-market reforms is deepening this crisis by severely undermining the key pillars of familial welfare security while rapidly transforming the model into a political economy of generalised insecurity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Elnaz Gholipour ◽  
Béla Vizvári ◽  
Zoltán Lakner

Sovereign debt ratings provided by rating agencies measure the solvency of a country, as gauged by a lender or an investor. It is an indication of the risk involved in investment and should be determined correctly and in a well-timed manner. The current system is lacking transparency of rating criteria and mechanism. The present study reconstructs sovereign debt ratings through logical analysis of data (LAD), which is based on the theory of Boolean functions. It organizes groups of countries according to 20 World Bank-defined variables for the period 2012–2015. The Fitch Rating Agency, one of the three big global rating agencies, is used as a case study. An approximate algorithm was crucial in exploring the rating method, in correcting the agency’s errors, and in determining the estimated rating of otherwise unrated countries. The outcome was a decision tree for each year. Each country was assigned a rating. On average, the algorithm reached almost 98% matched ratings in the training set and was verified by 84% in the test set.


Author(s):  
W. Mark C. Weidemaier

This chapter revisits the role of legal enforcement in sovereign debt markets. The conventional view is that the law of sovereign immunity denies creditors effective legal remedies. To many observers, weak legal enforcement is problematic, for effective legal remedies would facilitate credible repayment commitments. Though substantially correct, this perspective is also flawed. The assumption that creditors lack effective remedies implicitly treats sovereign immunity as a set of mandatory rules. In fact, sovereign lenders can and do bargain for greater enforcement rights. When courts enforce these bargains, legal remedies gain potency. Yet potent remedies need not improve the functioning of debt markets. Courts can create effective remedies against sovereign debtors only by imposing significant costs on third parties. Many loan debt contracts are drafted so as to maximize these externalities. The important question—given short shrift thus far—is whether the credibility-enhancing virtues of legal enforcement justify the costs.


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