scholarly journals Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Competitive Coordination

scholarly journals Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 946-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Group Communication ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Competitive Coordination

scholarly journals The differential impact of friendship on cooperative and competitive coordination

2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-452
Author(s):  
Gabriele Chierchia ◽  
Fabio Tufano ◽  
Giorgio Coricelli
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Differential Impact ◽  
Safe Alternative ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Competitive Coordination ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Tacit Coordination ◽  
Entry Games

Abstract Friendship is commonly assumed to reduce strategic uncertainty and enhance tacit coordination. However, this assumption has never been tested across two opposite poles of coordination involving either strategic complementarity or substitutability. We had participants interact with friends or strangers in two classic coordination games: the stag-hunt game, which exhibits strategic complementarity and may foster “cooperation”, and the entry game, which exhibits strategic substitutability and may foster “competition”. Both games capture a frequent trade-off between a potentially high paying but uncertain option and a low paying but safe alternative. We find that, relative to strangers, friends are more likely to choose options involving uncertainty in stag-hunt games, but the opposite is true in entry games. Furthermore, in stag-hunt games, friends “tremble” less between options, coordinate better and earn more, but these advantages are largely decreased or lost in entry games. We further investigate how these effects are modulated by risk attitudes, friendship qualities, and interpersonal similarities.

scholarly journals Testing for the emergence of spontaneous order

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 912-932 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Georgalos ◽  
John Hey
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Spontaneous Order ◽  
Complex Societies ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Final Good ◽  
Competitive Coordination ◽  
Single Input ◽  
The Government ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractWe report on an experimental investigation of the emergence of Spontaneous Order, the idea that societies can co-ordinate, without government intervention, on a form of society that is good for its citizens, as described by Adam Smith. Our experimental design is based on a production game with a convex input provision possibility frontier, where subjects have to choose a point on this frontier. We start with a simple society consisting of just two people, two inputs, one final good and in which the production process exhibits returns to specialisation. We then study more complex societies by increasing the size of the society (groups of 6 and 9 subjects) and the number of inputs (6 and 9 inputs respectively), as well as the combinations of inputs that each subject can provide. This form of production can be characterised as a cooperative game, where the Nash equilibrium predicts that the optimal outcome is achieved when each member of this society specialises in the provision of a single input. Based on this framework, we investigate whether Spontaneous Order can emerge, without it being imposed by the government. We find strong evidence in favour of the emergence of Spontaneous Order, with communication being an important factor. Using text classification algorithms (Multinomial Naive Bayes) we quantitatively analyse the available chat data and we provide insight into the kind of communication that fosters specialisation in the absence of external involvement. We note that, while communication has been shown to foster coordination in other contexts (for example, in public goods games, market entry games and competitive coordination games) this contribution is in the context of a production game where specialisation is crucial.

scholarly journals Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Games ◽  
Competitive Coordination

The Political Economy of Italy's Decline

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Private Goods

This book offers an interpretation of Italy’s decline, which began two decades before the Great Recession. It argues that its deeper roots lie in the political economy of growth. This interpretation is illustrated through a discussion of Italy’s political and economic history since its unification, in 1861. The emphasis is placed on the country’s convergence to the productivity frontier and TFP performance, and on the evolution of its social order and institutions. The lens through which its history is reviewed, to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, is drawn from institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory. It is exemplified by analysing two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one—employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private goods—and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The book follows the gradual setting in of this spiral, despite an ambitious attempt at institutional reform, in 1962–4, and its resumption after a severe endogenous shock, in 1992–4. It concludes that innovative ideas can overcome the constraints posed by that spiral, and ease the country’s shift onto a fairer and more efficient equilibrium.

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