scholarly journals Political Connections, Founding Family Ownership and Leverage Decision of Privately Owned Firms

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liu Qigui ◽  
Gary Gang Tian
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Jeannet ◽  
Thierry Volery ◽  
Heiko Bergmann ◽  
Cornelia Amstutz

AbstractThis chapter details how ownership structures evolved, starting from the early stages of a company to unfolding over time as ownership invariably passed on from one generation to another. Examples are offered on how and under what circumstances companies go public and how founders recruit new owners when ready to pass on the company. Specifically covered are single ownership and family ownership. To provide ownership stability and ownership control, the text describes efforts to keep control within the founding family, ways of passing ownership on to another family, and the process of shareholder agreements. Examples are provided on how companies recruit new owners and how companies approach the decision to go public vs. remaining privately owned.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-593
Author(s):  
Enni Savitri ◽  

Political connections have an essential role in the earnings management strategy. Political connections can influence earnings management practices. The research aimed to analyze the effect of politics and family ownership on earnings management practices. The sample is 92 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2016-2019. Methods of data using a purposive sampling method. Multiple linear regression is an analytical tool used to test the hypothesis. The results show that political connections influence profits. The company pays more attention to the company’s reputation and maintains the privileges of the political relationship that has existed between the company and the government. Family ownership affects earnings management. Family ownership has control rights that can be used to influence management in company profits. The novelty of this research is that political connections can influence earnings management.


Author(s):  
Rosida Ibrahim ◽  
Sutrisno T ◽  
M Khoiru Rusydi

This study aims to analyze the effect of executive characteristics and family ownership as a stimulus factor for tax avoidance and to see the existence of a political relationship as a moderating variable in the effect of executive characteristics and family ownership on tax avoidance. This research was conducted on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2017-2019. In this study, the sample was determined based on the purposive sampling technique with the criteria that the sample company was manufacture listed on the IDX for three consecutive years from 2017-2019, published an annual report in the 2017-2019 period sequentially, did not experience delisting, was not a company the IPO in 2018-2019, did not experience any losses and did not have an ETR value of more than 1. The research sample was obtained from as many as 138 companies with 3 years of observation. This study uses multiple linear regression analysis (Multiple Regression Analysis) and Moderate Regression Analysis (MRA) using the Statistical Product and Service Solution (SPSS) program. The results showed (I) executive characteristics had a significant positive effect on tax avoidance (II) family ownership had a significant negative effect on tax avoidance (III) political connections were not able to strengthen the executive's positive influence on tax avoidance (IV) political connections weakened family ownership on tax avoidance. This study can also show that the sample companies tend to comply with tax rules, they avoid sanctions and fines, and consider the risk of loss that must be faced by the company when proven to do tax avoidance.


2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-237
Author(s):  
Ronald C. Anderson ◽  
David M. Reeb

We examine the mechanisms used to limit expropriation of firm wealth by large shareholders among S&P 500 firms with founding-family ownership. Consistent with agency theory, we find that the most valuable public firms are those in which independent directors balance family board representation. In contrast, in firms with continued founding-family ownership and relatively few independent directors, firm performance is significantly worse than in non-family firms. We also find that a moderate family board presence provides substantial benefits to the firm. Additional tests suggest that families often seek to minimize the presence of independent directors, while outside shareholders seek independent director representation. These findings highlight the importance of independent directors in mitigating conflicts between shareholder groups and imply that the interests of minority investors are best protected when, through independent directors, they have power relative to family shareholders. We argue that expanding the discussion beyond manager-shareholder conflicts to include conflicts between shareholder groups provides a richer setting in which to explore corporate governance and the balance of power in U.S. firms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iman Harymawan ◽  
Mohammad Nasih ◽  
Muhammad Madyan ◽  
Diarany Sucahyati

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of firms with family ownership and their performance in Indonesia and further examine on how political connections affect this relationship. This study used 933 samples from 413 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the period between 2014 and 2016. Using ordinary least square (OLS) regression, the results shows that firms without family ownership (non-family firms) have better performance than firms with family ownership (family firms) in Indonesia. Furthermore, the findings also show that the performance of family firms significantly improve when the firms are affiliated with political connections. Our findings imply that establishing political connections in family firms will increase the performance of the firms.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Y.S. Chen ◽  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Guang-Zheng Chen

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