scholarly journals Under the 'Volcker Rule' in the United States, it is Proposed that Banks Will No Longer Be Allowed to Own, Invest in, or Sponsor Hedge Funds, Private Equity Funds, or Proprietary Trading Operations for Their Own Profit, Unrelated to Serving Their Customers: Can this Be an Effective Regulatory Response to Risk Issues Exposed During the Financial Crisis that Commenced in the Autumn of 2008?

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Harding
Author(s):  
Peter Wahl

The current financial crisis has not come about by chance. It is the result of a system that has emerged over the last 30 years and which Keynes may well have called the ‘casino economy’. The dominance of finance over real economy characterises the financial crisis, while finance itself is dominated by the all-encompassing target of maximum profit at all times. Other aims of economic activity such as job creation, social welfare and development have fallen by the wayside. In response, new actors are surfacing, e.g. the institutional investor (hedge funds, private equity funds, etc.), while new instruments are leading to highly leveraged and destabilising derivatives. The casino system has been promoted by governments and intergovernmental institutions to liberalise and deregulate financial markets. Although developing countries have not participated in the casino system, they have been suffering most from the spill-over into the real economy. The main lesson learnt is that the casino has to be closed.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Fichtner

During the last decades, institutional investors gained an ever more important position as managers of assets and owners of corporations. By demanding (short-term) shareholder value, some of them have driven the financialization of corporations and of the financial sector itself. This chapter first characterizes the specific roles that private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds have played in this development. It then moves on to focus on one group of institutional investors that is rapidly becoming a pivotal factor for corporate control in many countries – the “Big Three” large passive asset managers BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street.


Author(s):  
Spangler Timothy

This chapter considers future legal and regulatory responses to private investment funds in the context of a country’s current political dynamics. It begins with a discussion of the regulatory policy issues surrounding private investment funds before and after the global financial crisis, criticisms against private equity funds and hedge funds, and lessons from the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. It then examines indirect regulation of private investment funds as a way forward, along with financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. In particular, it explains how the global financial crisis has exposed the complexity of modern financial markets, noting that one of the primary drivers of this complexity has been financial innovation. The chapter concludes by analysing investor-centric approaches to addressing the governance challenge present in private investment funds.


2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-200
Author(s):  
Jae Hyun Gwon

In the context of the protection of individual investors of private investment funds in South Korea, this study examines the current regulation of private placements from legal and economic perspectives. It compares Rule 506 of Regulation D in the United States with the similar regulation of South Korea. The most distinguishing feature of South Korea’s regulation is that any individual who can evidence a certain investment amount, regardless of accreditation or sophistication, is eligible to participate in private equity funds, which has recently resulted in “incomplete sales” problems in Korea. To conform to the definition of private equity, it is best to abolish the threshold criteria of minimum investment amount. Otherwise, the “sales” of private equity via commercial banks and central institutions for financial stability must at least be banned so that individual investors do not confuse private placement with public offering. In return, public advertisement can be permitted for private equity funds with only accredited investors and sophisticated investors. Public fund investment in private equities are de facto private equities; they are inappropriate for individuals, who may be confused with private funds and public funds. As such, they need to be limited.


Author(s):  
Spangler Timothy

This chapter examines the governance challenge in private investment funds arising from investor protection failures. It begins with a discussion of the Madoff affair, which brought to the fore alleged failures in reporting, oversight and governance mechanisms regarding private investment funds, whether hedge funds, private equity funds, real estate opportunities funds or other more esoteric investment pools. It then considers some issues which the Madoff debacle drew attention to, including the presence of multiple fund vehicles in the same structure or in interconnected structures such as parallel funds, master-feeder, and fund of funds. It also analyses the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) concerns about hedge fund fraud and conflicts of interest that may arise in the business models of any of the participants in the private equity market. Finally, it describes ongoing diligence and oversight regarding private investment funds and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) concerns over due diligence involving private funds.


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