scholarly journals Benefits of Relationship Banking: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet ◽  
Chunlin Liu ◽  
Nicholas S. Souleles
Keyword(s):  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Relationship Banking

scholarly journals Benefits of relationship banking: Evidence from consumer credit markets

2018 ◽  
Vol 96 ◽  
pp. 16-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet ◽  
Chunlin Liu ◽  
Changcheng Song ◽  
Nicholas S. Souleles
Keyword(s):  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Relationship Banking

Competition and the Evolution of Relationship Banking in Local Credit Markets

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Di Salvo ◽  
Juan Sergio Lopez ◽  
Maria Carmela Mazzilis
Keyword(s):  
Credit Markets ◽  
Relationship Banking

scholarly journals The Effects of Competition in Consumer Credit Markets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Gissler ◽  
Rodney Ramcharan ◽  
Edison Yu
Keyword(s):  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit

scholarly journals The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andres Liberman ◽  
Christopher Neilson ◽  
Luis Opazo ◽  
Seth Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit

scholarly journals The Effects of Competition in Consumer Credit Markets

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (11) ◽  
pp. 5378-5415
Author(s):  
Stefan Gissler ◽  
Rodney Ramcharan ◽  
Edison Yu
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Extensive Margin ◽  
Credit Policy ◽  
Default Rates

Abstract This paper finds that banks and nonbanks respond differently to increased competition in consumer credit markets. Increased competition and a greater threat of failure induces banks to specialize in relationship business lending, and surviving banks are more profitable. However, nonbanks change their credit policy when faced with more competition and expand credit to riskier borrowers at the extensive margin, resulting in higher default rates. These results show how the effects of competition depend on the form of intermediation. They also suggest that increased competition can cause credit risk to migrate outside the traditional supervisory umbrella.

scholarly journals Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 256-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Dobbie ◽  
Paige Marta Skiba
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit ◽  
Probability Of Default ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Payday Lending ◽  
Loan Market ◽  
Payday Loans

Information asymmetries are prominent in theory but difficult to estimate. This paper exploits discontinuities in loan eligibility to test for moral hazard and adverse selection in the payday loan market. Regression discontinuity and regression kink approaches suggest that payday borrowers are less likely to default on larger loans. A $50 larger payday loan leads to a 17 to 33 percent drop in the probability of default. Conversely, there is economically and statistically significant adverse selection into larger payday loans when loan eligibility is held constant. Payday borrowers who choose a $50 larger loan are 16 to 47 percent more likely to default. (JEL D14, D82, G21)

scholarly journals The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andres Liberman ◽  
Christopher Neilson ◽  
Luis Opazo ◽  
Seth D. Zimmerman
Keyword(s):  
Credit Markets ◽  
Consumer Credit
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