The Federalist and Executive Power

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Pfiffner
Keyword(s):  
Executive Power ◽  
The Federalist

scholarly journals The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution

2021 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
William Treanor
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Early Republic ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Alexander Hamilton ◽  
The Federalist ◽  
Textual Basis ◽  
The Creation

At the end of the Constitutional Convention, the delegates appointed the Committee of Style and Arrangement to bring together the textual provisions that the Convention had previously agreed to and to prepare a final constitution. Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris drafted the document for the Committee, and, with few revisions and little debate, the Convention adopted Morris’s draft. For more than two hundred years, questions have been raised as to whether Morris covertly altered the text in order to advance his constitutional vision, but modern legal scholars and historians studying the Convention have either ignored the issue or concluded that Morris was an honest scrivener. No prior article has systematically compared the Committee’s draft to the previously adopted resolutions or discussed the implications of those changes for constitutional law. This Article undertakes that comparison. It shows that Morris made fifteen significant changes to the Constitution and that many of the Constitution’s central elements were wholly or in critical part Morris’s work. Morris’s changes strengthened the national executive and judiciary, provided the textual basis for judicial review, increased presidential accountability through an expansive conception of impeachment, protected private property, mandated that the census report reflect “actual enumeration,” removed the constitutional text suggesting that slavery was just, and fought slavery’s spread. This Article also shows that Morris created the basis for the Federalist reading of the Constitution. Federalists—notably including fellow Committee member Alexander Hamilton—repeatedly drew on language crafted by Morris as they fought for their vision of the Constitution. Because the changes Morris made to the Convention’s agreed language were subtle, both Republicans and Federalists were able to appeal to text in the great constitutional battles of the early republic. Modern originalists claim that the Republican reading reflects the original understanding of the Constitution, but this Article argues that the largely dismissed Federalist reading explains words, phrases, and punctuation that the Republican reading ignores or renders unintelligible. By contrast, the Federalist reading of the Preamble (which they saw as a grant of substantive power), the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses (which were contrasted to argue for expansive executive power), the Article III Vesting Clause (which they read to mandate the creation of lower federal courts), the Contracts Clause (which they read to cover public as well as private contracts), the Impeachment Clause (which they read to cover both nonofficial and official acts), and the “law of the land” provision (which they construed as a basis for judicial review) gives effect to Morris’s—and the Constitution’s—words.

scholarly journals The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEREMY D. BAILEY
Keyword(s):  
Political Thought ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Alexander Hamilton ◽  
Recent Argument ◽  
The Federalist ◽  
History Of

Central to the recent argument from the “unitary executive” is the claim that the unitary executive is consistent with the text and history of the Constitution. But because this veracity and importance of this claim is contested, unitarians also argue that the unitary executive is consistent with democratic theory. This article examines that argument by addressing a question in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton. Although Hamilton was an important defender of an energetic executive, and is associated with an expansive interpretation of executive power, he wrote inThe Federalistthat the president and Senate would share the removal power. In contrast with existing scholarship, which either overlooks Hamilton's statement on removals or dismisses it as a careless error, this article argues that Hamilton's statement limiting presidential removals illuminates his larger argument about executive energy. By showing how “duration” would check “unity,” this article clarifies Hamilton's political thought and offers an important critique of the modern argument from the unitary executive.

Modernization of Antimonopoly Policy in Russia (Economic Analysis of Proposed Changes in the Competition Law)

2005 ◽  
pp. 100-116
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Commodity Markets ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Per Se

The article is devoted to the analysis of the draft law "On Protection of Competition", which must substitute the laws "On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Commodity Markets" and "On Protection of Competition on the Financial Services Market". The innovations enhancing the quality of Russian competition law and new norms providing at least ambiguous effects on antimonopoly regulation are considered. The first group of positive measures includes unification of competition norms for commodity and financial markets, changes of criteria and the scale of control of economic concentrations, specification of conditions, where norms are applied "per se" and according to the "rule of reason", introduction of rules that can prevent the restriction of competition by the executive power. The interpretation of the "collective dominance" concept and certain rules devoted to antimonopoly control of state aid are in the second group of questionable steps.

Alexander Hamilton and the Early Republic in Edwardian Imperial Thought

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Kirkwood
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Africa ◽  
Early Republic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Alexander Hamilton ◽  
George Washington ◽  
American Federation ◽  
Treaty Of Versailles ◽  
The Federalist ◽  
The Federalist Papers

In the first decade of the twentieth century, a rising generation of British colonial administrators profoundly altered British usage of American history in imperial debates. In the process, they influenced both South African history and wider British imperial thought. Prior usage of the Revolution and Early Republic in such debates focused on the United States as a cautionary tale, warning against future ‘lost colonies’. Aided by the publication of F. S. Oliver's Alexander Hamilton (1906), administrators in South Africa used the figures of Hamilton and George Washington, the Federalist Papers, and the drafting of the Constitution as an Anglo-exceptionalist model of (modern) self-government. In doing so they applied the lessons of the Early Republic to South Africa, thereby contributing to the formation of the Union of 1910. They then brought their reconception of the United States, and their belief in the need for ‘imperial federation’, back to the metropole. There they fostered growing diplomatic ties with the US while recasting British political history in-light-of the example of American federation. This process of inter-imperial exchange culminated shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles when the Boer Generals Botha and Smuts were publicly presented as Washington and Hamilton reborn.

Presidential Privilege and the Freedom of Information Act

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Freedom Of Information Act ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
Government Secrecy

Executive privilege (EP) as a political tool has created a grey area of constitutional power between the legislative and executive branches. By focusing on the post-WWII political usage of executive privilege, this research utilizes a social learning perspective to examine the power dynamics between Congress and the president when it comes to government secrecy and public information. Social learning provides the framework to understand how the Cold War's creation of the modern American security state led to a paradigm shift in the executive branch. This shift altered the politics of the presidency and impacted relations with Congress through extensive use of EP and denial of congressional requests for information. When viewed through a social learning lens, the institutional politics surrounding the development of the Freedom of Information Act is intricately entwined with EP as a political power struggle of action-reaction between the executive and legislative branches. Using extensive archival research, this historical analysis examines the politics surrounding the modern use of executive privilege from Truman through Nixon as an action-reaction of checks on power from the president and Congress, where each learns and responds based on the others previous actions. The use of executive privilege led to the Freedom of Information Act showing how policy can serve as a congressional check on executive power, and how the politics surrounding this issue influence contemporary politics.

Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

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