Choosing between the Government and the Regions: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court Decisions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Dalla Pellegrina ◽  
Nuno M. Garoupa
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals The Existence of Decision Norms of the Constitutional Court as a Source of Legislative and Executive Laws

Lentera Hukum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
Adhitya Widya Kartika
Keyword(s):  
Court Decision ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Legal Certainty ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Government Institutions ◽  
Legal Response ◽  
The Government ◽  
Laws And Regulations

Norms are behavioral guidelines in the Indonesian legal state. Norms continue to exist in the legislation and juridical consequences of constitutional court decisions, and in particular, that of the Constitutional Court. Legal norms have principles that are applied to a wider hierarchy of legal norms and the production of legislation. In essence, the Constitutional Court's rulings have consequences on the actions of the government and therefore the action of governance. Including decision norms in the Constitutional Court's ruling has juridical consequences for the hierarchy of regulations and state legal actions in carrying out the function of government. This article aims to find out how to apply decision norms if there an identical or related decision exists within a different judicial institution. In government institutions bound by the Constitutional Court's decisions, application of decision norms resulted in chaos for the application and enforcement of the law. The implementing agency is faced with the same legal product, namely a verdict in another judicial institution. This causes no legal certainty. Rather than a solution or outcome, implementing agencies are faced with an identical legal response yet no legal certainty. The absence of legal certainty has consequences for government institutions that are bound by the Constitutional Court's decision. By utilizing a hierarchy of legal norms, the issue of rigidity and uncertainty caused by decision norms can be resolved. Likewise, in the legislature, the Constitutional Court's decision is the source of making legal norms. As the Constitutional Court’s decision is the source of legal norm production in the legislature, espousing a hierarchy of legal norms will enable laws and regulations that are formed to reflect justice, certainty and benefit. Keywords: Court Decision, Legal Norms, Government.

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

Waldpolitischer Jahresrückblick 2011

2012 ◽  
Vol 163 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willi Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Forest Policy ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Large Carnivores ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
The Government ◽  
European Forest ◽  
Forest Legislation ◽  
Forest Act

Annual review of Swiss forest policy 2011 The revision of the Forest Act, the adoption of the Forest Programme 2020 by the Federal Council as well as the preparation of the second contribution period of the New System of Financial Equalisation and Division of Tasks between the Confederation and the Cantons (NFE) shaped, in addition to the routine business, the forest policy of 2011. The parliamentary initiatives on forest and forest policy issues remained of about the same amount as in previous years, while the Federal Court decisions on forest legislation have declined significantly. In various forest-related sectoral policies, the government and parliament made important decisions. In climate policy, the Parliament adopted the CO2 Law. However, this has not yet happened to the revision of the Spatial Planning Act. In nature and landscape policy, the administration has prepared the Swiss biodiversity strategy so far that the Federal Council could send it out for consultation. The revision of the Hunting Regulation, with changes in the management of large carnivores, is nearing adoption. At the international level, the Federal Council has submitted the European Landscape Convention to the Parliament for ratification, and the European forestry ministers have agreed to the preparation of a European Forest Convention.

The Constitutional Court

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Butt ◽  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
Future Viability ◽  
The Government ◽  
National Legislature

Indonesia’s Constitutional Court, established in 2003, is often called a model of judicial reform for other courts in Indonesia and throughout parts of Asia. It reviews statutes against the Constitution, hears disputes about elections and between state organs, and decides presidential impeachment motions brought by the national legislature. This chapter shows that this court started strongly, performing its functions professionally and commanding respect from the government and citizens, despite having no enforcement powers. It even managed to push the formal boundaries of its jurisdiction and, in our view, began to ‘make law’, thereby usurping a legislative function. However, recent corruption scandals and poorly reasoned decisions have undermined its credibility and threaten its future viability.

scholarly journals A Populist Monster and the future of Constitutional Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.

Emergency powers of the authorities of the constituent units of the federation (states) in Russia, the USA and Brazil amid the spread of a new coronavirus infection

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 86-107
Author(s):  
Alexander Merkulenko
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Emergency Powers ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Coronavirus Infection ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
The Government

Due to the new coronavirus pandemic, high alert regimes were introduced across the Russian Federation in spring 2020. These emergency regimes were established exclusively by the state bodies of the Russian Federation’s constituent units – federal authorities did not introduce their own emergency regimes. This decentralized strategy of fighting the pandemic was also introduced by the USA and Brazil. Their states, without the sanction of the federal government, and in the case of Brazil, ignoring its bans, set emergency restrictions similar to those in Russia. The legal regulation of emergency regimes existed before 2020, when constituent units of the federation (states) actively used their emergency powers. However, the regimes introduced during the fight against the pandemic were slightly different to previous ones. The restrictions on rights and freedoms within these regimes were so severe that not only their proportionality was questioned, but there were also doubts as to whether the regional level of the government had the authority to establish such strict restrictions. In addition, the pandemic exposed old problems and revealed new shortcomings in the legal regulation of emergency regimes: lack of control over the realization of the emergency regime by legislative (representative) authorities, and gaps in legislative regulation – notably in the establishment of possible restrictions and of a mechanism for scrutinizing their proportionality. All this raised questions about the proportionality of the established restrictions. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation resolved a very insignificant amount of the problems. While the United States and Brazil faced similar issues, the practice of scrutinizing implemented restrictions in these countries was more common. This article takes domestic and foreign experiences into account, while examining certain aspects of the establishment and the operation of regional emergency regimes.

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