Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households

Author(s):  
Daniel Shaviro
2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 162-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Ho ◽  
Nicola Pavoni

We study the design of child care subsidies in an optimal welfare problem with heterogeneous private market productivities. The optimal subsidy schedule is qualitatively similar to the existing US scheme. Efficiency mandates a subsidy on formal child care costs, with higher subsidies paid to lower income earners and a kink as a function of child care expenditure. Marginal labor income tax rates are set lower than the labor wedges, with the potential to generate negative marginal tax rates. We calibrate our simple model to features of the US labor market and focus on single mothers with children aged below 6. The optimal program provides stronger participation but milder intensive margin incentives for low-income earners with subsidy rates starting very high and decreasing with income more steeply than those in the United States. (JEL D82, H21, H24, J13, J16, J32)


Author(s):  
Phillip Spier

This paper examines how the Working for Families (WFF) package changed work incentives for WFF recipient families. While not being able to examine work incentives directly, we were able to measure changes in effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) for WFF recipients. The lower the EMTR a person faces, the more financially profitable it is for them to increase their hours of work or earnings. Conversely, a high EMTR over a range of earnings can be a disincentive for a person to work more. Beneficiary families and the vast majority of low income non­beneficiary families in receipt of WFF had lower EMTRs as a result of the policy changes. The April 2006 changes to the WFF package decreased EMTRs for middle­to­high income families already in receipt of WFF Tax Credits, but increased EMTRs for families who became newly eligible for this component as a direct result of the changes.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 165-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Diamond ◽  
Emmanuel Saez

This paper presents the case for tax progressivity based on recent results in optimal tax theory. We consider the optimal progressivity of earnings taxation and whether capital income should be taxed. We critically discuss the academic research on these topics and when and how the results can be used for policy recommendations. We argue that a result from basic research is relevant for policy only if 1) it is based on economic mechanisms that are empirically relevant and first order to the problem, 2) it is reasonably robust to changes in the modeling assumptions, and 3) the policy prescription is implementable (i.e, is socially acceptable and not too complex). We obtain three policy recommendations from basic research that satisfy these criteria reasonably well. First, very high earners should be subject to high and rising marginal tax rates on earnings. Second, low-income families should be encouraged to work with earnings subsidies, which should then be phased-out with high implicit marginal tax rates. Third, capital income should be taxed. We explain why the famous zero marginal tax rate result for the top earner in the Mirrlees model and the zero capital income tax rate results of Chamley and Judd, and Atkinson and Stiglitz are not policy relevant in our view.


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